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Introduction

SINCE 1950 petroleum companies have paid over one and one-half
billion dollars for leases off the Louisiana coast. The leases are sold at
a competitive auction conducted by the Bureau of Land Management
of the Department of the Interior. The bids submitted by individual
companies for a tract often differ by startling amounts. Clearly, the
uncertainty connected with what might be found when a tract was
drilled was a major cause of the variation of bids among companies
bidding on a given tract.
The research efforts which led to this monograph began with the
discovery of the summary listing of all bids on tracts offered for lease
by the New Orleans office of the Bureau of Land Management. The
large amounts of money spent and the wide variation of many tracts
promised a fascinating study. The work reported here had two main
goals: ( 1) to examine the bidding records to see what patterns and
regularities existed which would be of help to a firm in deciding how
much to bid for a tract lease and ( 2) to develop an optimal bidding
strategy for a firm based on the observed bidding behavior. A statistical analysis of the bid records did lend support to several important
hypotheses about the behavior of bidders; these hypotheses were then
used for the development of an optimal strategy model. From this
model a formula was derived for calculating the expected profitmaximizing bid as a function of the expected value of the tract, the
predicted standard deviation of the bids of competitors, and the
estimated number of competing bidders. It is further shown that the
expected profit is usually not very sensitive to a small misestimation
in the number of bidders or to the standard deviation of the competitor bid distribution. The bidding rule developed is novel, but its
implications are not at variance with commonly held ideas about the
behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets.

It was not necessary in building the model to distinguish between
the search for oil and that for gas. Petroleum ( or oil) is here used as a
convenient collective noun to stand for valuable liquid or gaseous
hydrocarbons which are produced by drilling into a permeable formation which contains them.
There are two kinds of competitive bidding situations. One is closed
or sealed bidding, in which the participants independently submit
offers to a judge who accepts the highest according to established
rules. The other is open bidding, at which the particii:>ants publicly
make offers until no one is willing to raise his offer, the high bid being
the winner. While this monograph is focused on the specific problem
of optimal sealed bidding for petroleum leases in the Louisiana offshore area, some of the results may be applicable to other bidding
situations.
Without the stimulation and helpfulness offered by many people
and organizations this study could not have been completed. Dr.
Wallace F. Lovejoy was not only an invaluable source of knowledge
about the petroleum industry, but also a patient and sympathetic
counselor. Professors David Huang, Carter Murphy, John Spratt,
and Paul Minton each assisted in a number of ways. Harold Rudel of
Sun Oil Company, Warren Davis of Gulf, John Arps, petroleum consultant, John Rankin of the New Orleans office of the Bureau of Land
Management, and C. J. Bonnecarrere, secretary to the Louisiana State
Mineral Bond, granted valuable interviews. My wife, Deborah, prepared the index; her patience and help were great comforts while the
manuscript was being revised. All responsibility for any errors that
remain lies, of course, solely with the author.

Bidding for Offshore Oil

I

Uncertainty and the Selection of
Investments

THE OUTCOME of the drilling of a wildcat well on a lease is almost
never known precisely at the time the well is drilled. In fact, even a
probability density function of the present values of the possible outcomes is typically not known with certainty. But even wildcat wells
are not drilled blindly; before a rational entrepreneur undertakes such
a project, he must have enough information to convince him that the
possibilities of gain are sufficient to justify the drilling costs. Thus,
it can be persuasively argued that, although a potential investor may
not be able to specify an objective probability density function, he,
in effect, does crudely specify a subjective probability density function
in the process of deciding whether or not to undertake the investment.'
Many petroleum companies, of course, are not limited to undertaking one investment at a time. If more than one investment is being
considered, then the rational investor ought to be more concerned
about the overall prospects of a possible investment portfolio for gain
or for loss than about the outcomes of the individual investments in
isolation. If the outcome of each project in a portfolio is not completely independent of the outcome of every other project in the portfolio, then the relationships between the investments may be important
in determining the overall prospects. This introduces no theoretical
problems so long as these relationships to each other are known; then
the overall prospects of the portfolio can be determined, at least in
theory, from the individual investment prospects and their relationships to each other.
Interrelationships between possible returns are of at least two
distinct kinds: ( 1) possible future events may affect the outcomes of
some investments in a similar manner and ( 2) making one investment may substantially affect the distribution of outcomes for one
or more other investments. For example, a change in the market
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price of crude oil would affect the outcomes of many, many petroleum company investments. Or an investment in developing some
novel production technique might affect the outcome of investments
in areas where this technique is applicable. If the investor is indeed
interested in the probability density functions of the outcomes of
possible portfolios and if the outcomes of individual investments are
not independent of each other, then the most desirable portfolio
cannot, in general, be selected by decision rules applicable to each
possible investment in isolation. Rather, the desirability of including
an investment in a portfolio must be evaluated on the basis of its
effect on the portfolio frequency distribution of outcomes. Indeed, a
diversifl.ed portfolio may appear very much more desirable to an
investor than some multiple of any of the single investments available. This concept underlies Markowitz's explanation of the general
desirability of diversifl.cation.2
Now, if the outcome of investing in a given portfolio can be stated
only in probabilistic terms, how does the typical investor react to
the parameters of the probability distribution associated with the
portfolio in appraising the desirability of owning it? This question
has fonned the basis for an enormous amount of recent theoretical
and empirical research. It is not feasible to attempt here to summarize this research except to say that there is general agreement
that investors prefer a higher to a lower expected return, everything
else being equal, and dislike the possibility that the return may be
lower than expected. Thus, in comparing the desirability of portfolio
outcome frequency distributions, not only will the means of the two
distributions be considered, but also their shapes. Among the possible
portfolios that can be formed from a typical set of potential investments, it is usually possible to increase the expected return from
the portfolio only at the expense of introducing a greater variability
of return. Different investors appear to have different tradeoffs between expected return and return variability. For example, one petroleum fl.rm may like a high aggregate risk portfolio from which it
expects to earn high returns. Another fl.rm may accept lower expected
profl.ts in return for a greater probability of earning at least the
expected return rate.
The relative variability of the outcomes of a portfolio as compared
to the variabilities of the individual component investments can be
made low if there exist enough investments with relatively independent outcomes or if some investments can be found which will
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more likely turn out well if others turn out poorly and vice versa. If,
however, the outcomes of all available investments exhibit a strong
positive dependence it may not be possible to form a portfolio from
these investments which has substantially less expected relative
variance than any of the individual investments. If, in addition, the
relative variabilities of all the available investment outcomes are
about the same, then the decision process of an investor is simplified
-he simply adds investments in descending order until either his
capital or the set of available investments is exhausted. It is important
to emphasize that this will be the case only where the outcomes of
all investments are so strongly correlated and the relative variabilities
of the outcomes so nearly the same that diversification cannot significantly reduce return variability. In all other cases the optimal
portfolio cannot be chosen in such a simple manner.
There are a number of factors which may reduce the potential
benefits available from diversification. The general level of business
activity may affect a very large fraction of available investments in
much the same manner; investments with outcomes independent of
or negatively related to the general level of business activity may
either be unavailable or have such high prices ( due to the strong
demand and apparently limited supply) as to lose much of their
attractiveness. Similarly, systematic bias in estimating the frequency
distribution functions of the outcomes of individual investments can
lead to serious misestimations of the frequency distribution function
of the overall portfolio. Thus, the investor always runs the risk that
he has misestimated the frequency distribution function of the portfolio he chose, and that another portfolio would have been a better
a priori choice. 3 The investor risks being in a situation similar to that
of a pollster whose sampling procedure is biased; increasing the
sample size may not make the pollster's predictions perceptibly
more accurate, just as increased "diversification"' cannot correct for
systematic bias in the investor's valuation estimation procedures.
Further, investments which have to be "managed" may turn out to
be more variable in unskilled hands or may be costly to undertake
because of the expense necessary to hire an expert manager.
Regardless of what portfolio selection criteria the investor adopts,
unless he is extremely conservative; Monte Carlo simulations will
likely show considerable divergence between expected value of portfolio assets at the end of some reasonably long time period and their
actual value. Markowitz gives an interesting illustration of this phe-
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nomenon.• The probability distribution of return on a hypothetical
portfolio ( which does not include cash) is
Return Rate
Probability

-.2
.1

-.1
.2

0
.3

+.l
.3

+.2
.1

The expected value of return rate is +.0l; yet at the end of ten
periods in the particular simulation, the investor who had invested
in this particular portfolio had only 81 percent of what he started
with. At the end of 600 periods, he had 2,690 percent; yet by the end
of 650 periods, this had dropped to 571 percent! In other words, if the
dispersion of possible outcomes is at all large, the investor may be
subject to some violent whipsaws over time, even though he is following some "optimal'' policy.
While there is agreement that investors dislike variability of returns
-especially variability which would result in a return lower than
expected-there has been no agreement over an appropriate objective
measure which can be used to classify investment portfolios according to degree of "riskiness." Nonetheless, the word "risk" is in such
widespread use that it is difficult not to use it in the following chapters. It will be used to denote the sort of variability in expected
returns that investors do not like.

II

Uncertainty and Optimal Bidding
Strategy for Offshore Petroleum Leases

1.

RISK IN THE

PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION
INDUSTRY

DISCOVERING
commercial petroleum deposits is a notoriously risky'
business. Excellent discussions of the character of these uncertainties
may be found in McDonald 2 and Kaufman.3 However, these presentations tend to center around the difficulties in obtaining and interpreting geophysical and other information about areas of interest,
the expenses of leasing and drilling which must be incurred in order
to discover a suspected deposit, and the uncertainties connected with
development and production. In other words, these discussions tend
to describe a frequency distribution function for the outcomes of
investments in an area. Usually there is a large chance of a small
loss-that geophysical and other preliminary work will be done but
that prospects will be deemed so poor that further work is at least
temporarily abandoned. There also may be a moderate chance for a
large loss. Such losses will occur if preliminary indications are so
favorable that leasing and drilling are undertaken but no commercial
deposit is found. Finally, there is some chance for a gain. The gain
which will result if a really valuable hit is made, of course, provides
the incentive for the whole exploration process.
The fact that there is a large dispersion in the frequency distribution functions of typical individual investments, however, is not sufficient evidence of a "high risk" industry. If adequate opportunity for
meaningful diversification is available, then the dispersion of the outcome of a portfolio of investments, each with an individually high
dispersion, may be relatively low. If risk-reducing diversification is
possible, then it is no longer rational to consider each investment as
a separate entity; the ultimate desirability of a potential investment
will depend largely upon how its frequency distribution function of
7
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possible outcomes is related to the frequency distribution function of
other investments in the portfolio. 4 To the extent that each investment
will tend to behave in the same manner as others in the portfolio,
this diversification will not reduce risk, and each investment may be
considered independently of others. Therefore, the important question
to be considered in forming hypotheses about the behavior of the
firms bidding for Louisiana offshore petroleum lands is the extent
to which the expected return from the different tracts can be considered to be independent, negatively dependent, or positively dependent.
Commercial petroleum deposits are classified as pools, fields, and provinces.
Terms such as "pool," "field," "province," and "subprovince" are useful in
describing and locating the various oil and gas accumulations and occurrences.
They combine both geographical and geological factors that are commonly
understood by the geologists, geophysicists, and engineers of the petroleum
industry. But these terms, like many others in geology, grade into one another,
which makes it difficult, at times, to define their exact meaning. Local usage
generally prevails eventually, even though it may not reflect the best or most
accurate scientific classification and terminology.
Pool. The simplest unit of commercial occurrence is the pool. It is defined
as the body of oil or gas occurring in a separate reservoir and under a single
pressure system. A pool may be small, underlying only a few acres, or it may
extend over many square miles. Its content may be entirely gas, or it may be
entirely or mainly oil. The term major pool is arbitrarily taken to mean a pool
that will ultimately produce 50 million barrels or more of oil.
Field. When several pools are related to a single geologic feature, either
structural or stratigraphic, the group of pools is termed a field. The individual
pools comprised in a field may occur at various depths, one above another, or
they may be distributed laterally throughout the geologic feature. Geologic
features that. are likely to form fields are salt plugs, anticlinally folded multiple
sands, and complex combinations of faulting, folding, and stratigraphic variation.
. . . The amount of oil that a pool or field will produce is not a distinguishing
characteristic. In the East Texas pool and in many of the Middle East pools,
the oil is obtained from a single reservoir; yet the ultimate production of each
of these pools will be greater than that of many fields or even provinces. Since
a field may contain several closely related pools, the terms "pool" and "field"
are often confused, especially during the early stages of development.
Province. A petroleum province is a region in which a number of oil and
gas pools and fields occur in a similar or related geological environment. Since
the term is loosely used to indicate the larger producing regions of the world,
the boundaries of a so-called province are often indistinct. The Mid-Continent
province of the south-central United States, for example, has definite regional
characteristics of stratigraphy, structure, and oil and gas occurrence. Consequently, the term has a specific meaning for geologists and the petroleum indus-
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try. Subprovinces may occur within provinces; with the Mid-Continent province,
for example, we find the Cherokee sand subprovince of southeastern Kansas and
northeastern Oklahoma, the Anadarko Basin subprovince of western Oklahoma
and northwestern Texas, the Reef subprovince of westcentral Texas, the Panhandle subprovince of northwestern Texas, and many others.5

Within a province, it is very difficult to imagine how there might be
a negative dependency between the outcomes of investments in
tracts. This would mean that knowledge of success in one tract would
increase the a priori probability of failure on another, or vice versa.
On the other hand, because a province "is a region in which a number
of oil and gas pools and fields occur in a similar or related geological
environment,"" a positive dependency is likely. If success is obtained
from a particular structure type at one place in the province, then it
becomes more likely that drilling a similar structure elsewhere in the
province would also be successful. The degree of positive dependency
will tend to vary inversely with the distance between the structures
and directly with their geological similarity. Also there may be reasons, perhaps connected more with the origin of the petroleum than
with the trap in which it is contained, for the existence of general
positive tendencies within an area. In fact, Kaufman gives considerable evidence for believing that the amounts of oil contained in the
various fields in a basin 7 tend to be distributed according to a definite
frequency distribution function.• If enough fields have already been
discovered in the basin, the parameters of the distribution can be
estimated. This distribution can then be a valuable aid in estimating
the amount of oil which may be found in an undiscovered field in the
basin. In other words, the probability distribution for the amount of
oil which may be found if the well is successful is, in part, a function
of the amounts of oil contained in all known fields in the basin.
Similarly, if oil is not found on one tract, it becomes less likely that
oil will be found in similar tracts in the province.
Biases in value estimation procedures may also cause positive dependency. Such biases may be most prevalent in the interpretation
of geological and geophysical data. Suppose that a firm consistently
overestimates the expected value of certain type structures. Whatever
method the company adopts for selecting a desired optimal portfolio,
it is probable that more tracts containing the overvalued structures
will be bid high, and thus more such tracts will probably be won
than if there had been no such bias. But these tracts will on the

10
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average turn out more poorly than expected. Thus the diversifl.cation
is not as effective as the company thought, and the expected value
of the portfolio is lower.
Such biases in estimation procedures are likely for several reasons.
A considerable time may elapse after a decision is made to bid for a
lease before even one well is completed or the lease is abandoned. Even
if the first well turns out to be a promising producer, the full extent
of the deposit and a good estimate of the potential productive capability may not be known for several years. Also, new or modified
exploration techniques are occasionally introduced; before these
techniques are properly evaluated there may be divergent opinions
concerning their effectiveness. And the typical type of formation
being examined changes with the introduction 0£ the new techniques
and the relative completion of evaluation of structures and formations
recently popular. For all these reasons a firm can never be sure that
the predictions it makes concerning the expected value and shape
of frequency distribution functions are not biased, at least for large
classes of tracts.
Also, diversification within or among provinces within the United
States cannot help protect against crude or gas price changes or
widespread allowable production changes. These factors will tend
to affect many producing tracts in a somewhat similar manner, even
though the tracts be widely scattered and producing from assorted
structures. Too, diversification is costly in terms of the extra information which must be collected and evaluated for each investment
possibility considered. Thus, even though further diversification might
be expected to increase the portfolio's desirability somewhat, a point
will eventually be reached when the expected gain from more diversification is offset by the loss caused by money spent for information
about possible portfolio additions. When such a state is reached,
there will, at least temporarily, be no more incentive toward diversification.
Most of the firms that have submitted bids for federally owned
offshore tracts are quite large, subsidiaries of large firms, or members
of a group of firms that is large in the aggregate. For instance, in
the October 13, 1954, sale the following companies submitted more
than five bids-Shell, Gulf, Standard of California, Humble, Standard
of Indiana, Placid, Magnolia, Phillips, and Forest. Humble was
controlled by Standard of New Jersey and Magnolia by Socony
Mobil. Of these nine companies or parent companies, only two did
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not have assets reported in excess of one billion dollars in the July,
1955, Fortune list of the five hundred largest industrial corporations in
the United States ( neither Placid nor Forest was listed either in the
Fortune tabulation or in Moody's Industrials 9 ). In addition, two
groups of companies or combines made in excess of five bids. Continental, Atlantic Refining, Tidewater, and Cities Service made up the
most active combine with twenty-six bids submitted; the Pure,
Standard of Ohio, and Sun group submitted fourteen bids. The aggregate assets of each of these combines were also quite respectable.
Of course, many other assets than those directly related to production are included in total asset figures; however, these companies and
combines apparently do have the means to diversify and to obtain
information for intelligent diversification.
In summary, each company or group seemingly has the resources
to invest in enough different production opportunities so that it can
realize the full benefits possible from available diversification. 10 However, the available diversification is limited because of the high cost
of information and evaluation, and the benefits of diversification are
limited because of positive interdependencies of returns from tracts
within provinces, and even among provinces.

2.

THE

ALLOCATION

OF MONEY

TO A PROVINCE

The "Gulf Coast of the United States" is listed by Levorsen as a
petroleum province. 11 The continental shelf area off the coast of
Louisiana is, of course, only a part of this province. Suppose a new
wildcat sale is announced by the Bureau of Land Management. How
should a firm go about preparing a set of optimal bids?
Of course, a Rrm may not wish to bid at all. Actual bidding will be
the result of a multistage process which can be terminated short of
bidding. At the end of any step, the next step must appear desirable
or the process will be terminated. For instance, a firm may decide
that it is not interested in the offshore Louisiana area; that is, the
company believes, a priori, that it has better investment possibilities
elsewhere. To make a further investigation into the possibilities of
the area is felt to be an unwarranted expense. Even though a company
is initially interested, it may still decide, after gathering information,
not to bid. In this case the firm felt the expense of gathering and
interpreting information to be justified by the prospects which might
have been uncovered, but sufficiently attractive prospects did not
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appear. Also, a firm may not wish to investigate all the tracts offered.
This may occur because of budgetary or time constraints, or because
the company feels that only a subset of the tracts are worthy of
investigation.
Suppose, however, that a firm has investigated at least some of the
tracts and found a number with positive expected values. What then?
First, it would seem very pertinent for the company to evaluate the
potentialities of the tracts with positive expected values in terms of
how the acquisition of some of them would tend to affect the firm's
overall investment position with respect to its desired goals. Particularly to be considered are the company's current activities or lack of
activities in the area; are there potential economies of operation
available on the one hand, or is there danger of overconcentration
on the other? What other alternative uses are available for the money
which might be spent? How badly is the potential production needed?
And, especially, how are the expected returns from this area related
to those from other areas? These and similar questions are apt to
sound vague, but they must be dealt with if the company is to proceed on a unified ( and thus risk-reducing) plan rather than on a
piecemeal basis. At this stage the ultimate decisions will depend on
the experience and goals of the management. The task of the corporate
staff is to supply the active management with views of the alternative
investment combinations which are as clear as possible, so that the
managers can make well-informed decisions.12
If a firm decides to bid at all, it may wish to win some minimum
acreage or number of tracts. There may be some economies of scale
available from supplying and operating several drilling platforms in
the same general area. Also, most integrated oil companies seem to
have a strong desire to produce as large a fraction as is economically
feasible of their refinery crude requirements. While a firm may be
able to trade crude produced far from one of its refineries for crude
produced nearby, the number of provinces in which a given company
may operate is not unlimited and goals may be assigned to each area
in an attempt to reach self-sufficiency. To reach such goals, a certain
amount of acreage will need to be tested. In addition, the wish to
keep competitors from obtaining too many desirable tracts may be
important. Considerations like these will also help determine the
amount of money which should be allocated to an area for the purchase of leases at a sale.
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OF THE INVESTOR

A basic problem of many discussions of investment under uncertainty, including that of the previous chapter, is that the term "available investment" is never properly defined. An idea of the view-span
of the investor is necessary in order to think about the smallest investment or item of investment that he will ordinarily consider. The president of a multi-department corporation may consider the individual
departments as his individual investment opportunities; at the most,
he will probably not concern himself regularly with anything less than
the more important projects at the department level. The department
manager, in tum, must be concerned with all his projects, but will not
wish to get involved in the detailed administration of each of them;
his view-span is mostly limited to the individual projects. The project
manager is concerned with how best to allocate funds among alternative ways for proceeding with the project, the foreman with how
best to perform the particular task he has been assigned, and so on.
Thus, a very real problem in a large company is how far down the
overall company investment planning procedure should go. Regardless of the level chosen, there will generally be those below this level
with the authority to make some kinds of investment decisions. Presumably, the best advice that can be given to these people is to do
the best they can with what they have, i.e., to try to maximize the
profit from the project they are working on from their viewpoint of
that project. Down to what level should the corporate staff of a large
petroleum company plan investment activities in detail? Perhaps only
down to the basin or subprovince level. If so, then within such a
region as the Louisiana offshore area, constrained expected profit
maximization might well be an optimal policy.

4.

AN AREAL BIDDING STRATEGY

There are at least three kinds of arguments for proposing expected
profit maximization as a goal within an area. The first sort of argument
is that the opportunities for risk-reducing diversification within an area
may be limited. This contention is discussed in section 1 of this chapter. Second, as explained in the immediately preceding section, the
view-span of the corporate staff limits the area down to which concern about possible inter-areal relationships of outcomes of separate
investments may go. Finally, the profit maximization model developed
in chapter 6 does in some sense take risk into account. For a given
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expected value for a tract, this model requires the optimal bid to be
lower, the larger the expected dispersion of competitors' bids. A
major source of the expected variation in competitors' bids appears to
be differences in opinion about the expected value of the tract, such
differences reflecting a general uncertainty about the tract value.
Thus, if the model developed is a useful one, the uncertainty connected with the evaluation of the expected value of a tract is, in a
sense, taken into account and the effect of the uncertainty is to cause
a lower bid to be offered. This lowering of the bid is not a risk
discount, but has a similar effect.
Therefore, the following company strategy for purchasing leases
is proposed: ( 1) on the basis of the economically available information, the firm should allocate money to all areas in which it is interested ( such as the Louisiana offshore region ) in such a manner as is
expected to produce that available combination of expected return
and risk which is most satisfactory to the top management; ( 2)
within each area, the goal of profit maximization subject to applicable
constraints should be pursued. One such constraint, the desire to win a
specified minimum acreage, has already been mentioned in section 2
of this chapter. Other possible constraints will be discussed in the
following chapter, in which the elementary mathematics of constrained profit maximization for bidding at a lease sale will be presented.

III

The Development of a Bidding Strategy

1. AN ABSTRACT BIDDING STRATEGY
SUPPOSE THAT the goal of a company is strict profit maximization. The
firm is preparing to submit a bid for a valuable object at a closed bid
auction. There exist no constraints on the amount which may be bid
or on the size of the return expected. Let R be the firm's estimate of
the value of the object, X an amount which might be bid for the
object, and P(X) the probability the bid of amount X will be the
winning bid. Define the profit to the company if it wins as R - X,
the difference between the estimated value and the cost of the object.
The expected profit from a bid of amount X is thus ( R - X) P ( X)
and the goal of the firm is to maximize this product.'
Let E ( X) equal this expected profit from the bid of amount X.
The first order conditions for maximizing E ( X) require that

dE(X)
dX

d[(R - X) P(X)]
dX

= O.

(3.1)

If P'(X) is used to stand for dP(X) , then (3.1) can be written
dX

R P'(X) - X P'(X) - P(X)
or

R

= X+

P(X).
P'(X)

=0

(3.2)

(3.3)

It is not possible to solve ( 3.3) directly for X unless P ( X) can be
written as an explicit function of X. It may be possible, however, to
approximate the optimum X if P(X) can be estimated for a sufficiently
wide range of values for X.
If bids for a number of objects must be submitted simultaneously
15
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and there are no constraints on the total amount which may be bid,
then the optimum bid for each object may be determined through
the use of equation ( 3.3). If constraints exist, a solution may be
obtained from the application of Lagrangian multipliers. This method
sometimes yields results which are easy for an economist to interpret.
Suppose the only constraint requires the sum of all bids to equal a
given amount C. Let ET equal the sum of the expected profits from
the bids which are placed on each of the objects up for sale. Then the
constraint may be written,
C-X1-X2-,,,-Xn=0
and the function
V = E1 + E2 + ... + E. + 11.(C- X1 - X2 - ... - X.)
formed, where A is an undetermined Lagrange multiplier. The first
order condition for maximizing ET may now be obtained by partially
differentiating V with respect to Xi, X2, . . . , X. and 11.and setting
each partial differential equal to zero. Inspection of the resultant
system of equations shows that
8Ei
iJE,
<3 .4)
ax, axi 11..

=

=

This requirement is the very familiar equalization of marginal returns.
In this context, the total expected profit will be maximized when the
marginal expected profits from the last money unit bid on each object
are all equalized, provided the required second order conditions are
satisfied; A is the expected marginal profit from the marginal money
unit bid.
If company constraints also require a minimum expected profit from
every dollar bid, the Lagrangian multiplier method is still capable
of yielding a solution, since it is possible to use more than one constraint. However, it is quite possible that all constraints cannot be
satisfied simultaneously. In such a case, the constraints can be varied
until either an acceptable solution is found or it becomes apparent
that the firm should make no bids at all on this collection of objects.
Linear programming may be useful in complex problems.
Other kinds of constraints, such as that whichrequires the expected
amount actually spent to equal some specified amount,
I P(X.) X. = C',
n

may also be treated by this method, but the interpretation may not be
so straightforward.
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THEORY

An interesting analogy to equation

( 3.3) can be found in the
theory of monopsony. Consider a very simple case in which a firm
produces a product Y using only one input, Z; the production function
is linear and Y and Z are measured in such units that dY/dZ
1. The
price P. of Z is a function of the quantity of Z which the firm purchases
per time period. The product selling price P, does not depend on the
amount of Y produced and sold. Under these assumptions the firm's
profit 7T per time period may be written

=

7T

= P, Y -

P. Z.

(3.5)

The :6rm wishes to employ that quantity of Z which will enable it to
maximize its profit. The Rrst order conditions for maximizing 7T require that
d7r
dZ

= P,

dP
- P. - Z dZ

= 0, since

dY
dZ

=

I.

Rearranging,
Py

z

= P. + dZ/dP

•

(3.6)

Now X is the amount offered in the bidding model; it corresponds
to P., the price of the input in the monopsony model. Similarly, R
corresponds to Py, P(X) may be interpreted as a quantity. Of course,
if the probability of winning is, say, one-third, this does not mean
that the bid will surely purchase one-third of the object. But if one
can imagine the auction being repeated a large number of times under
identical circumstances, then one would expect to win one-third of
the time. The expected number of objects purchased per auction is
thus one-third; this is the sense in which P( X) may be thought of as a
quantity. Since the object itself undergoes no transformation simply
by being auctioned off, P(X) corresponds both to the quantity of input
bought and the output sold; this is the reason for assuming that
dY/ dZ
I in the monopsony model. Thus, the analogy between ( 3.3)
and ( 3.6) is shown. In either case, the value of a unit of output
( R or P,) equals the price offered for a unit of input ( X or P.) plus
the quantity of the input (P(X) or Z) divided by the rate of change
of the quantity of the input with respect to the input price
( dP(X)/dX or dZ/dP). The sum of the terms to the right of the equals

=
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sign in ( 3.6) has been called the marginal resource cost;• it is the
rate of change of total cost with respect to changes in the quantity
of input purchased. Thus the firm's profit is maximized when the
marginal resource cost is equal to the value of a unit of output, provided, of course, that the second order conditions are satisfied.
This analogy is introduced in order to show something about the
relationship between the competitive bidding model developed here
and conventional nonprobabilistic price theory. A profit maximizing
firm preparing to bid at a sealed bid auction has much the same
motivation as a firm purchasing an input in a monopsonistic market.
A bidder can increase his probability of winning ( i.e., the expected
quantity purchased) only by increasing the amount bid ( and thus
paid if the bid is accepted); the monopsonist can purchase greater
quantities of the input only if he is willing to pay a higher price for
all units of the input.
3.

COMPETITIVE

BIDDING USEFUL ONLY IN MARKETS
Is UNCERTAIN

IN WHICH

PmCE

There must be some uncertainty about the value of the offered
object in order to provide incentive for an :tuction. If there exists
complete agreement among potential bidders about the value of an
object, then the seller need not go to the trouble of holding an auction;
he can realize as much by selling to an arbitrarily selected buyer at
the commonly agreed price.
There are at least two reasons why the seller may be uncertain
about the price which can be charged for an object. First, the offered
object may be a "pig in a poke" in the sense that its physical characteristics are only imperfectly known at the time the bids are submitted.
This lack of knowledge may be due to the reluctance of the party
offering the object to having it thoroughly examined, or it may result
from a combination of the high cost of accurate information and the
difficulty of keeping discovered information secret. If important
information about the object is costly but hard to keep secret, the
potential buyer may prefer to delay detailed evaluation until after
he has purchased the object. Otherwise, he may find himself in the
awkward position of supplying costly information free to his competitors; he may have spent money that has not purchased commensurate competitive advantage.
Second, the value of durable objects is dependent upon conditions
which will prevail in the uncertain future. Thus, value estimates for
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durable objects are dependent upon assumptions about the future.
Even if two parties agree in every detail about the present physical
characteristics of the object, their estimates of its value may be quite
different because of divergent expectations.
For these reasons, the seller may not know the highest price at
which he could sell the object. This uncertainty may make some sort
of auction sale attractive.
If the seller decides to dispose of the object by means of a sealed
bid auction, an additional source of uncertainty enters-the bidding
strategies of those who might be interested in purchasing the object.
A bidding strategy may be defined as a procedure for arriving at a
decision about the optimum amount to bid which takes into account
not only the estimated value of the object, but also some assumptions
about the expected behavior of the other bidders.
The fact that all bids are not expected to be identical means that
over a range of bids it will not be possible to predict with virtual
certainty whether or not a particular bid will win. At best, only a
probability that a given bid will win may be associated with that
bid. This probability of winning has been denoted as P ( X).
4.

ASSUMPTIONS

ABOUT

COMPETITOR

BEHAVIOR

The probability that a given bid will win is obviously a function of
the expected behavior of each potential competitor. Upon what does
the expected behavior of each competitor depend? Upon the information he believes he possesses about the object, his expectations
about the future, and his beliefs about the probable actions of his
competitors.
In order to discuss competitor behavior it is often necessary to
consider simultaneously the decision problems of several bidders;
therefore, it will be convenient to adopt the convention that firm O is
the "client" firm on which the analysis is directly focused. The actions
of other bidders will be important because of their influence on the
optimal course of action for firm O; when necessary for clarity, symbols may be subscripted with appropriate firm numbers.3
There are two extreme types of hypotheses about competitor behavior which the client might adopt. On the one hand, firm O may
consider that its opponents will generate their bids by means of
processes which are independent of the strategies of other bidders.
An example of such a bid-generating process is described in the
following quotation:
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bid
Some land men representing large oil companies contend that one should
ve
competiti
for
adjusted
profit
long-run
an amount which will yield a normal
or
bid,
higher
a
to
losing
either
about
d
concerne
too
be
not
then
and
realities
4 These are two
table.
the
on
money
winning and leaving a substantial sum of
5
hazards which must be accepted as part of the sealed bidding procedure.

In other words, bids should be determined strictly on the basis of
what the tract in question is expected to be worth to the bidder; the
behavior of competitors is not to be considered. Firm O might think
that all other bidders act in this way. Presumably, the reason they
would so act is that they feel they do not have significant information
for predicting possible behavior of opponents.
On the other hand, the client firm may believe that each participant
in the bidding expressly considers his opponents' probable actions as
part of his own analysis of the problem. This is the assumption which
is commonly made in game theory analyses. Christenson devotes
chapters of his book to the study of the implications of both hypotheses.• A strict game theory approach to the problem of bidding
for offshore petroleum does not appear promising to this writer and
will not be further pursued in this monograph. But strategies which
do not explicitly consider the reactive behavior of competitors in
certain circumstances suffer from a grave defect. It is necessary to
understand why this problem may exist in order that it may be
avoided.
If firm O adopts the first hypothesis about competitor behaviorand thus believes that it is the only bidder who is explicitly considering the probable actions of its competitors-it will be very advantageous for it to keep the fact that it is using a bidding strategy secret.
If the client firm does not keep its strategy secret, its opponents may
now find that they do have some information which will help in
determining the probable action of firm O; if so, they would be foolish if they did not use this information in preparing their own bids.
If they do use this information, it will change the distribution of
possible competitor actions which firm O expects; thus the bid which
would have been optimal for the client is now no longer optimal, and
the client's advantage from the use of the strategy will be lessened
if not negated. These considerations may help explain why petroleum
firms tend to be very secretive not only about tract geological information but also about the procedure by which their bids are derived
from the geological and other information available.
However carefully a firm may keep this information secret, if it
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consistently follows a strategy alert competition should soon be able

to discern the general strategic pattern:

With the large dollar amounts involved, every potential competitor must be
in possession of certain geological and geophysical information regarding the
tracts of interest. Most of this information is obtained by the same geological and
geophysical procedures, and it will be a safe assumption, therefore, that most of
the competition is looking at the same basic data.7

The firm's competitors are likely to know at least some of the data on
which its decisions are based; therefore clever competitors should be
able to find out something about the process which converts the raw
data into actual bids. In sum, a firm with keen and intelligent competitors cannot hope that they will stand by and watch it reap the
benefits of a good bidding strategy without reacting themselves.
Therefore, a bidding strategy for a firm which repeatedly bids against
nearly the same set of competitors should take this reaction into
account.
Specifically, if the competitors have similar assets and goals, there
may exist an equilibrium strategy which it is optimal for each competitor to follow. This equilibrium would presumably be arrived at
after a "learning" period forced by competitive pressures and based
on the reactions to actions of the participants.
Of course, there may exist periods in which one or more firms have
a temporary advantage which can be exploited. For instance, one
firm may discover a method for gaining better information from geophysical exploration records. One firm might develop a better bid
formulation procedure while others are still using techniques which
do not so efficiently use the available information. Or, one or more
firms may be temporarily operating with either unusually high or low
amounts of available capital. If a firm does have special information
about the likely strategies of its competitors, this information should
certainly be taken into account in the optimum bid generating procedure.
Yet expecting a competitor's strategy to be markedly different from
one's own can be a dangerous procedure. Assessing the degree of
skill which an opponent will play has always been an important
problem in game theory. A quite useful assumption has been that the
opponent pursues consistently a strategy which is optimum for him.
To expect otherwise is a reflection on the opponent's intelligence and
competitive ability. But if all who bid are "equals" in assets and goals,
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then what is optimal for the opponent will also be an optimal strategy
for the client firm! Though sometimes useful, assumed strategy differences should be used with caution. The model developed in chapter
6 is based on the assumption of equal competitors; the optimal strategies for all the bidders are identical, though the offered bids are not
necessarily the same because each firm probably estimates the uncertain value of the tract as a different amount.

5. A DIFFICULTY INHERENT IN A PREVIOUS MODEL
Of course, a basic difficulty in trying to implement the strategy
outlined in the first section of this chapter lies in estimating P(X).
Two widely referenced articles about bidding strategies unfortunately
contain some potentially misleading statements about how P ( X) may
be estimated when there will probably be more than one competing
bidder.•
There are, of course, two common kinds of sealed bidding situations. The first type may be called purchaser bidding; prospective
purchasers submit bids for a valuable object. The highest bid wins.
The second type may be called seller bidding. In this case, someone
who desires to purchase a specified collection of goods or services
asks for bids from potential suppliers. The qualified supplier who
bids the lowest amount wins the purchase agreement.
The theory discussed in this monograph is all developed in the
context of purchaser bidding. It is obvious, however, that the same
basic equation,
E(X)

=

(R - X) P(X),

(3.7)

can serve both cases by interchanging R and X in the parenthesis and
redefining R. In plirchaser bidding ( R - X) represents the expected
profit if the bid of amount X wins; in seller bidding ( X - R) represents expected profit conditional on X being the winning bid, if R is
redefined to be the cost of producing the required collection of goods
or services. Thus, the basic theory for optimal seller bidding will
formally be little different than that for purchaser bidding. There is
thus no necessity for exhaustively discussing both types.
In his article in Operations Research Friedman develops his theoretical formulation in the context of seller bidding.• Hanssmann and
Rivett, who base their development on that of Friedman, use the
context of purchaser bidding. ' 0 The following discussion of the method
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for estimating P ( X) espoused by these authors is made for the
familiar purchaser bidding situation.
Suppose, these authors argue, that the client Rrm knew that there
would be only one other Rrm bidding against it, and that further it
could somehow estimate the probability density function of its opponent's bid, f ( X,). In order for Rrm O to win, its bid Xa must be
higher than that of its competitor. The probability that Xo will be
greater than X, is

(3.8)
In other words, the probability that Xo will win is equal to the fraction of the area of the probability density function for X, which lies
below Xa. This result follows clearly and properly from the assumptions.
However, suppose the client Rrm knows there will be n competitors
bidding against it, but can estimate density functions [f(X,), f(X2),
... , f ( Xn) J for each of the competing bidders. Friedman concludes
that the probability of winning with a bid of Xa, "when the competitors are known, is simply the product of the probabilities of defeating
each of the known competitors." 11 In formal terms, this statement
asserts that 12

[Prob (X 0

Prob ( Xo > x,, Xo > X2, , , , , Xo > Xn)
X1 )J [Prob (X 0 > X2)] ... [Prob (Xa

>

This result is valid only if for all O < i :::;;n, 0

<

=

> Xn)].

(3.9)

j :::;;n, and i # j'3
(3.10)

Equation ( 3.10) will not in general be valid; if it is known that
Xa > X, it will typically be more likely that Xa > Xi than if no
information about the relative magnitudes of Xo and X, is known.
Friedman's statement is true only if the frequency distribution functions [f(X,), f(X2), ... , f(Xn)] are completely independent of each
other; the more usual situation will be that one or more of the parameters of each frequency distribution function are dependent upon the
observable characteristics of the collection of goods or services on
which the bid is being made and the current "state of the world." In
such a case, X, and Xi will not be unconditionally independent of
each other and equations ( 3.9) and ( 3.10) will not be valid, though
X, and X; may well be mutually independent given their ;oint depen-
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dence on the characteristics of the object of the bidding and current
environmental conditions.' 4 The possibility of dependence between
X, and X; should be explicitly taken into account in formulating the
bidding strategy; otherwise, paradoxical results may be obtained.
This may perhaps be made clearer by an analogy. Imagine a handicapped horse race with three entrants-horses A, B, and C. Suppose
that the handicapping had been done with such skill that the owner
of each horse thought that his horse had a probability of exactly }' of
defeating either of the other horses. Using the symbolism A > B to
denote horse A crossing the finish line sooner than horse B, each owner
thus would agree on the following probabilities:
Prob (A > B) = },,
Prob (B > A) = ¾,
Prob (C > A) = ¾,

Prob (A > C) = ¾,
Prob (B > C) = ¾,
Prob (C > B) = ¾.

Suppose now that each owner wishes to calculate the probability that
his horse will win the race. The owner of A, if he followed Friedman's
method, would calculate the probability of his horse winning the
race as
Prob (A > B, A >C)
= [Prob(A > B)] [Prob (A>
(¾) = Jt
=

on

C)]

Similarly, the owner of B would calculate the probability of his horse
winning as ~~, as would C. But clearly this method cannot be correct,
for the sum of the individual probabilities of winning ought to be 1.
Of course, a correct expression for the probability of horse A winning is
Prob (A > B, A > C)
= [Prob\A > B)] [Prob (A>

C I A>

B)].
(3.11)

Prob ( A > C I A > B) may be evaluated by examining the list of
possible finish orders, all of which are equally likely according to the
assumptions: ( 1) A > B > C, ( 2) A > C > B, ( 3) B > C > A, ( 4)
B > A > C, ( 5) C > A > B, and ( 6) C > B > A. If it becomes
known that A > B, then finish orders ( 3), ( 4), and ( 6) are not possible. In two of the remaining possible finish orders A > C; therefore,
Prob (A> C I A> B) equals%. Then, using (3.11),
Prob (A

> B, A > C) = (¾)

(%)

= Jt
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In a perfectly handicapped race between three horses, the probability
of a given horse winning is K
It is also important to note that ( 3.11) is not the only formula by
which Prob ( A > B, A > C) may be calculated. The following
formula is equally valid and will give the same numerical result:
Prob (A > B, A > C)
= [Prob (A> C)] [Prob (A>

B I A>

C)].

This analogy is introduced to help make clear why equation ( 3.9)
might not be correct and to show a situation in which Friedman's
prescription might be misleading. Clearly, in this example the probabilities of defeating each competitor individually cannot just be multiplied in order to get the probability of defeating both.
Returning to the bidding context, one correct expression for the
probability of the client firm winning with the bid Xo over the bids of
n competitors is
Prob (Xo > x,, Xo > x., ... 'Xo > Xn)
[Prob (Xo > X,)] [Prob (Xo > X. I Xo > X,)] ...
[Prob (Xo > Xn I Xo > X1, Xo > x., ... 'Xo > Xn-1) ]. (3.12)

=

The right hand side of ( 3.12) can no doubt be simplified somewhat
for many practical problems.
6.

ESTIMATING

PROBABILITY
CoMPETITORs'

DENSITY

FUNCTIONS

OF

Bros

In order to complete the development of a bidding strategv, it is
necessary to find some way to estimate the probability distributions
of competitors' bids, since these distributions are necessary for estimating P(Xo), the probability that a bid of amount X made by the
client firm will win. Fortunately, an extensive body of data exists for
a particular bidding situation. These data make it possible to test
statistically hypotheses about bidding behavior and to infer the a
priori probability distributions of competitors' bids. These data are
the records of the bids for petroleum leases for tracts on the federally
owned outer continental shelf off the Louisiana coast. Before describing the hypotheses and the results of the statistical tests, it is necessary
to discuss the setting in which these bids were generated.

IV

Petroleum Leasing on the Louisiana
Outer Continental Shelf

is a submarine plain which borders nearly
every continent. Off the Louisiana coast, the downward slope of this
plain is relatively gentle. For instance, the ocean depth 90 miles south
of Cameron, Louisiana is only about 120 feet; 20 miles south of Grand
Isle, the ocean depth is about 130 feet. There is no sharp geological
discontinuity marking the Louisiana shoreline. Therefore, when oil
and gas discoveries were made near the coast, there was every reason
to expect that similar discoveries might be made offshore. However,
technological difficulties conneeted with drilling, production, and
transportation were so severe that only a very few wells were drilled
off the coast prior to World War II, and these were in shallow water.
At this time the state of Louisiana claimed ownership of all its offshore lands. Just prior to the close of the war, farsighted members of
the Louisiana Mineral Board and its staff saw that technological
improvements would likely be made which would allow drilling and
production in ever deeper water at reasonable costs. They therefore
set about establishing a "Modern Leasing Program" to systematize
leasing procedures. The offshore lands with a water depth of roughly
120 feet or less were divided into twelve areas, each of which was
further subdivided into 5,000-acre blocks.' Such blocks were the
largest tracts which could be covered by a single lease. Each 5,000acre block was further subdivided into 64 equal areas.2 Such a 78.1acre tract was the smallest area which could be leased.
Between August, 1945, when the "Modern Leasing Program" was
inaugurated, and October, 1948, approximately seven hundred leases
were granted. In November, 1948, all offshore leasing under this program was suspended after the Department of the Interior claimed that
all lands more than three miles from shore belonged to the federal
government. Louisiana immediately made a counterclaim of ownership
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out at least three leagues ( 10.35 miles) from the coast. Eventually
the federal courts ruled in favor of the Department of the Interior.
Immediately, however, a new dispute arose, this time about the
location of the shore. In many places there is no definite seacoast;
there is only a brackish marsh in which the average water depth
increases slowly as one moves toward the sea. The Department of the
Interior claims one coastline; the state of Louisiana claims another,
which is in some places as much as twenty miles from the federally
defined shore. The dispute has not yet been finally settled. The
Louisiana outer continental shelf lands are thus divided into four
zones. Zone 4 lands are conceded by both parties to be under federal
control. The area in Zone 3 is also under effective federal control,
but would come under state control if Louisiana's claim for control
of a three-league strip offshore should be revived. Zone 2 lands are
claimed by both parties because of the dispute in regard to the shoreline.
In 1954 the state resumed granting leases on Zone 1 land in accordance with the "Modern Leasing Program," and the Bureau of Land
Management, a division of the Department of the Interior charged
with the administration of public lands, began its own leasing program. At present, the Bureau of Land Management has jurisdiction
over Zones 2, 3, and 4, though all proceeds from Zone 2 tracts are
being held in escrow pending settlement of the ownership dispute.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act" established the leasing
procedures to be used by the Bureau of Land Management. The
lease blocks designated by Louisiana were taken over intact and new,
similar ones added to extend the coverage out to a depth of about
five hundred feet. A lease conveys the right to drill wells on the property and to produce petroleum in conformity with regulations issued
by the Bureau of Land Management and the Louisiana Department
of Conservation. The lease continues for five years and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in commercial quantities or approved
drilling or well-reworking operations are being conducted.
Permits for geophysical exploration of unleased tracts are freely
granted. When a firm discovers a tract on which it might like to bid,
it may nominate this tract to the Bureau of Land Management for
inclusion in the next sale. Sales of offshore lands have occurred at
irregular intervals. The Bureau of Land Management may also nominate tracts which are adjacent to those on which production is being
obtained; otherwise petroleum lying beneath these tracts may be
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drained away without additional lease bonus payments to the Department of the Interior.
Lease payments are of three distinct types. The lease bonus is a
sum of money which is paid at the time the contract is consummated.
Rentals are annual payments which must be paid until the lease
expires or is surrendered back to the leasing authority, or until commercial production is obtained. This system of rental payment is
designed to provide an incentive to the lessor to test the lease as
soon as possible and either to get into production or to surrender the
tract back to the state quickly, while leaving the lessor some flexibility of operation. Royalty payments are calculated as percentages
of the total well-head value of the oil and gas produced. The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act specified that the bid variable might
be either bonus or royalty, but not both, with the royalty in no case
less than 12½ percent. For all sales to date, the secretary of the
interior has prescribed lease bonus as the sale variable and set the
royalty demanded at 16~~percent. The secretary of the interior, on
the advice of the Bureau of Land Management, has the right to reject
all bids for a tract if none is deemed sufficiently high. Out of the 786
tracts on which offers have been received, all bids have been rejected
on 40 tracts. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does not specify
an exact procedure for such rejections. Most appear to have occurred
on tracts adjacent to producing tracts.
The staff of the Bureau of Land Management has a policy of not
recommending acceptance by the secretary of the interior of any
lease bonus bids of less than $15 per acre. It is clear that the participants in the bidding understand this policy, as no bids less than $15
per acre have been offered. This minimum is designed to make outright speculation expensive. If there were no minimum, leasing tracts
for which current prospects seem very poor might appear attractive
through the hope that improved exploratory techniques might make
some of these apparently worthless tracts valuable.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act also provides for annual
rentals to be set by the secretary of the interior at the time of the
lease offering. Rentals demanded have ranged up to $3 per acre per
year, but the average has been lower than this amount. When compared with average lease bonuses and drilling costs, these rentals
appear small, and it seems unlikely that they really provide much
incentive for early drilling.
The New Orleans office of the Bureau of Land Management also
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handles the lease sales of federally controlled lands off Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida coasts, and has published summaries of
all sales to date. No bids have been received for tracts off Mississippi
or Alabama. Only one sale has been held for Florida offshore
lands. At this sale, held May 26, 1959, twenty-three tracts were bid
on, but in no case was there more than one bid per tract. Thus, these
data cannot be used for testing hypotheses about the distribution of
bids on a tract. Considerable interest has been shown in Texas outer
continental shelf lands, and tracts in this area have been offered at
several different sales. However, these bids were not included in the
data used to test hypotheses about bidding behavior and the functional form of P ( X) because the Texas offshore area has not proved
nearly so productive as that of Louisiana and the average per acre
winning lease bonus bid changed over time from $347 at the sale of
November 9, 1954, to $19 at the March 16, 1962, sale. A similar decline
did not occur for the Louisiana offerings; therefore it seemed best not
to mix the two sets of data.
Only bids received for Louisiana outer continental shelf lands from
October, 1954, through April, 1964, have been included in the data for
statistical analysis. Table 1 provides a summary of the various sales
included. In all cases but one, tracts on which all bids were rejected
were included in the data on the hypothesis that these bids were as
legitimately offered as any others. Of course, these bids generated no
receipts to be included in the total bonus figure. The one exception
is the sale of August 11, 1959. Here, there was only one bid on each
of the nine tracts for which the bids were rejected by the secretary of
the interior; these nine bids have been deleted from the analyzed
data. After the October 13, 1954, sale, officials at Kerr-McGee found
that they had misinterpreted their maps and placed winning bids on
seven tracts they did not want. After an investigation the Bureau of
Land Management allowed Kerr-McGee to retract these bids, which
have also been omitted from the tested data. Finally, in the February
24, 1960, sale record one bid is reported for tract 779 and two bids
for tract number 780, but both tracts have identical location identifiers.
It seems reasonable to suppose that one of the location identifiers is
in error; however, the safest course seemed to be to delete these three
bids also. Table 1 thus shows eight sales at which 2,350 bids were
made on 777 tracts. The average tract size was 4,130 acres, and the
average per acre lease bonus paid was $361. In all, 3,078,000 acres
were leased for a total bonus of $1,109,000,000.
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90

59

327

395

116 4,390

7/12/55
8/11/59

171
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39
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2/24/60
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125
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247 3,710
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Seven
Erroneous
Kerr-McGee
Bids Omitted
Nine
Rejected Bids
Not Included
Three Bids
on OCS Tracts
Nos. 799 and
780 Omitted

186
4,490
4,640 288
1,140 2,710
1,430 1,850

487 2,350 3,078 1,109 4,130 361
nt,
SOURCE:U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manageme
undated).
hed,
mimeograp
Orleans,
(New
Sales
S
OC
of
Recap
Total

1,524

777

Bid

The sales of August 11, 19.59, October 29, 1962, and April 28, 1964,
are of a somewhat different character from the others. They are distinguished by a smaller number of tracts offered and bid on, and a
much higher per acre bonus paid for the tracts leased. These are
called "drainage" sales; the tracts offered are adjacent to currently
producing tracts. This proximity accounts for the higher per acre
bonus paid. All the other sales are called "wildcat" sales. Here, the
tracts offered are not usually contiguous to current production. At
drainage sales, the owner of the adjacent producing lease has access
to information gathered during the drilling and operation of the producing wells which will not be known to others, who must rely
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almost exclusively on geophysical data. This extra information may
include an estimate of the thickness of the producing strata, the
reservoir pressure, and usually hints about the total volume of oil and
gas contained in the deposit and the directions in which the deposit
probably extends. Thus, bidding by others than the owner of the
adjacent producing property is especially risky, for it means bidding
against another who probably has a more accurate estimate of the
value of the tract. The drainage sales were included in the data subjected to statistical analysis to find out whether the bids followed the
same pattern as those in wildcat sales.
The Department of the Interior has chosen to use sealed rather
than open bidding for the Louisiana outer continental shelf lands.
At open bidding, strategy often dictates that participants initiate the
bidding at levels considerably below the maximum they are willing
to offer. As the bidding progresses, each party may actively participate
in the bidding until a competitor's offer exceeds the maximum he is
willing to pay; then he drops out. As the bids continue to increase,
eventually a bid will be made which no one is willing to raise. This
bid wins. How high, then, has the price been bid up? To the maximum
that any participant is willing to pay? Not necessarily. The winner
may have been prepared to offer much more than he actually paid,
but all that was required to win was an offer slightly in excess of the
maximum anyone else was willing to make. Thus, in an open bidding
situation, the amount realized is just in excess of the second highest
amount anyone is willing to offer.•
In a closed bidding situation, the amount realized will be that of
the highest bid. There is no assurance, however, that the bid a firm
will make at a closed auction will be identical with the maximum bid
it would make at an open auction for the same object. At a closed
auction, it may well be more attractive to enter a bid below the
maximum one would be willing to pay at an open sale in hopes of
winning at a lower price. In fact, the profit maximizing model developed in chapter 6 is built around this idea. If one knows the value
of the object to himself, can regard the bids of others for the object
as random drawings from a known frequency distribution function,
and can estimate the number of competing bids which will be entered,
then one can determine a bid which will maximize the expected profit.
The resulting optimal bid does not necessarily equal the maximum
amount one would offer in an open bidding situation; it may be considerably lower.
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Also, if more than one object is offered at a sale another important
distinction arises. At closed bid sales, all bids on all offered objects
are usually collected before the results of the bidding on any of the
objects are announced. At open bidding, however, the objects are
usually offered serially; that is, the public bidding for one object is
completed before the bidding on the next is begun. In this case,
optimal bidding strategy seems likely to become dynamic in the sense
that the outcome of previous sales affects planned bids on yet unsold
objects.
After an extensive study, Mead has concluded that it is not possible
to recommend uniformly either open or sealed bidding as the most
appropriate method for selling government-owned natural resources."
The structure of the industry which uses the resource, the degree of
competition in the market for the resource, and the probability of
tacit collusion among buyers are important determining factors in
his analysis.
There appear to be two major reasons why the secretary of the
interior has chosen to use sealed rather than open bidding for the
Louisiana outer continental shelf lands. The first is an honest belief
on the part of many concerned public officials that the aggregate
expected revenue to the government from these sales will be higher
under the closed bidding system." These officials seem to think that,
in general, the highest bid offered at a closed bid auction will be in
excess of the second highest amount anyone would be willing to bid
at an open auction. Second, closed bidding is typically a somewhat
more orderly procedure, taking less time to conduct and being easier
to control and administer.

V

Statistics of Louisiana Outer Continental
Shelf Lease Bids

1. THE PURPOSE
OF THE STATISTICAL
TESTS
THEPROFITMAXIMIZING
STRATEGY
discussed in chapter 3 requires that
P(Xo), the probability that a bid of amount Xo will win, be estimable
over the range of feasible bids for each tract. In order to estimate
P( Xo) for a given Xo, the client must possess some beliefs about the
probable bids of his competitors. If the bids of the competitors can
be assumed to be random drawings from a population which is distributed according to some theoretical frequency function whose
parameters are known, and the number of competitors who will bid
is also known, then it may be possible to express P ( Xo) in a fairly
simple form. If one or more of the parameters of the frequency distribution function of the number of bidding competitors is not known,
but must be estimated, the determination of P(Xo) becomes more
complicated, but may still be possible. Therefore, in this chapter three
major questions will be treated: ( 1) Can an acceptable frequency
distribution function for the bids on a tract be found? ( 2) If so, how
can the parameters of this frequency function be estimated? ( 3) How
can the number of competing bids best be estimated?
2. THE DISTRIBUTION
OF Bms
The most striking feature apparent from a cursory examination of
the bid data is the wide variation of bids on many of the tracts for
which there was more than one bidder. Table 2 shows all the bids
received for the first four tracts listed in the Bureau of Land Management summary of the sale of October 13, 1954, for which there were
multiple bids.
Hypotheses about the form of the distribution of bids can be
developed in two stages. First, one may speculate about the likely
33
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TABLE 2
SAMPLEOF PER ACRE Brns FROM SALE OF OCTOBER13, 1954
Tract" Number 481 Tract Number 405
Company Amt. Bid
CATCb
Shell
Gulf
Pose
Cal Stdd

$451.20
223.00
100.30
100.03
85.20

Company Amt. Bid
Shell
Gulf
CATC

$220.00
100.30
40.40

Tract Number 409
Company Amt. Bid
Shell
CATC
Gulf
Cal Std

$520.00
200.80
200.40
85.10

Tract Number 408
Company Amt. Bid
Gulf
Shell
CATC
POS
Cal Std

$800.60
511.00
451.20
350.03
272.10

SouRCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Bid
Recap of OCS Sales, p. 1.
"Each tract had an area of 5,000 acres.
hCATC is the abbreviation for a consortium formed by Continental Oil, Atlantic
Refining, Tidewater Oil, and Cities Service.
'POS is the abbreviation for a similar combination of Pure Oil, Standard Oil
( Oh;o), and Sun Oil.
"Standard Oil Company of California.

distribution of value estimates on a tract. Second, bidding strategy
may be considered as a transformation of value estimates into actual
bids. This transformation may either preserve the form of the distribution or alter it, depending upon the type of transformation and
the original distribution of value estimates. One might, for example,
assume the value estimates for a tract to be random drawings from
a normal distribution, each company's estimate differing from the
"true value" by some error term which tends to be normally distributed. The error term, in this context, may be considered to have components arising from three sources: ( 1) differences in interpretation of
available geophysical information; ( 2) different expected contributions
of the tract to each firm's current investment objectives; and ( 3) differences in expectations about the future. If one also assumes a uniform bidding strategy in which each company bids the same fraction
of its value estimate, then the bids on each tract should appear to
be random drawings from a normally distributed population, since
the linear transformation of a normal distribution is still a normal
distribution. After a hypothesis about the frequency distribution of
the bids on individual tracts has been formed, the next step obviously
is to test it with the data available. The hypothesis that the bids on a
tract are normally distributed will not survive even an inspection
for symmetry. The normal distribution is symmetrical; therefore, the
expected number of observations greater than the arithmetic mean
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equals the expected number of observations less than the arithmetic
mean. The distributions of bids on tracts are typically not symmetrical
in this sense. Table 2 is illustrative of this asymmetry. The arithmetic
mean per acre bid on tract 481 is $191.95; there are two bids above the
mean and three below. For tract 405 the mean bid is $120.23; there
is one bid greater than the mean and two less. There is only one bid
above the arithmetic mean bid of $251.27 for tract 409 ( and three
below the mean); for tract 408 there are two bids above the mean of
$476.99 and three below. For all the tracts in the sale of October 13,
1954, on which there were more than two bids,' there were 110 bids
greater than the respective arithmetic mean tract bids and 166 bids
less.
J. J. Arps has advanced the hypothesis that the bids on a tract
tend to be distributed lognormally. 3 "The lognormal distribution may
be defined as the distribution of a variate whose logarithm obeys the
normal law of probability."• In his paper Arps advances no theoretical
explanation why the bids might tend to be distributed lognormally;
he offers lognormality as an empirical observation. However, a rationalization for this phenomenon can be fairly easily developed.
It [the lognormal distribution] arises from a theory of elementary errors combined by a multiplicative process, just as the normal distribution arises from a
theory of elementary errors combined by addition. 5

Thus, "the distribution of the product of N independent random
variables tends to lognormality as N + oo, under very general conditions.''• In the process of arriving at a bid many different factors are
considered. Is it not possible that these factors are subjectively combined multiplicatively rather than additively in arriving at a bid?
Such a multiplicative process could account for the lognormal distribution of bids on a tract.
The hypothesis of lognormality was tested by the KolmogorovSmirnov test.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test is a test of goodness of fit. That i:;,
it is concerned with the degree of agreement between the distribution of a set
of sample values [observed] and some specified theoretical distribution. It determines whether the scores [observations] in the sample can reasonably be thought
to have come from a population having the theoretical distribution.
Briefly, the test involves specifying the cumulative frequency distribution
which would occur under the theoretical distribution and comparing that with the
observed cumulative frequency distribution. The theoretical distribution repre-

36

BIDDING FOR OFFSHORE OIL

sents what would be expected under H 0 [the hypothesis to be tested]. The point
at which these two distributions, theoretical and observed, show the greatest
divergence is determined. Reference to the sampling distribution indicates whether
such a large divergence is likely on the basis of chance. That is, the sampling
distribution indicates whether a divergence of the observed magnitude would
probably occur if the observations were really a random sample from the theoretical distribution. 7

In order to use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test for goodness of fit to a lognormal distribution on each tract, it is necessary to
know the mean and the variance of the theoretical lognormal distribution with which the actual distribution is being compared. If these
parameters must be estimated from the observed distributions themselves, the sensitivity of the test is reduced. It is thus desirable to
avoid estimating one or both of the parameters ( the mean and the
variance) of each theoretical lognormal distribution directly from each
set of tract bids if possible. Therefore, it seems reasonable to investigate the problem of estimating these parameters under the assumption
that the bids are lognormally distributed, hoping to avoid estimating
both of the parameters from the individual observed bid distributions.
In this manner, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be made as sensitive as possible. Then, if the hypothesis of lognormality of bid distributions is not rejected, some of the information necessary for estimating P( Xo) will already have been developed.
Suppose one assumes that the bids on a tract are indeed distributed
lognormally. If one looks at all the bids offered at a sale, there exist
two possible hypotheses about this set of bids. The first is that the
bids on the individual tracts are not statistically distinguishable from
each other; that is, that all bids offered at the sale may be regarded as
random drawings from the same distribution. The second hypothesis
is that the sets of bids offered for the individual tracts are statistically
distinguishable from each other. There are three ways in which the
second hypothesis may be true: ( 1) the means of the individual tract
distributions might differ, but the variances be the same; ( 2) the
variances might differ but the means be the same; and ( 3) neither
the variances nor the means might be the same.
The hypothesis of equality of means among the various tracts offered
at a sale is not very attractive, since it seems far more likely that the
geophysical and other information available would lead to different
mean bids on tracts with different prospects. However, it might be
the case that the tracts offered at a sale tended to be of such similar
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quality that the difference among the tract mean bids would not be
statistically significant. Such a finding would be of great importance in
determining P(Xo), since it would mean that a firm would have only
to estimate the mean bid for the entire sale rather than the mean bid
for each individual tract.
The F-test may be used to test the hypothesis of equality of means
among various samples. Assuming a lognormal distribution, the appropriate hypothesis to be tested is the equality of the arithmetic means
of the logarithms of the bids on each tract within a sale. The procedure
for applying the F-test is discussed in many references, among them
Richmond.' Application of the F-test uniformly led to the rejection of
the hypothesis of equal means. The results are summarized in table 3.
Thus, when applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test it will be necessary to estimate the mean bid for each tract from the observed bids
on that tract.
The hypothesis of constant variance of bids on tracts within sales
is interesting because of its implications about the bid generating
process. It implies that large bids do not tend to be proportionately
more or less precise than small ones." If all firms bidding on a tract
have similar needs for the tract and are following the same bidding
strategy, then the differing bids may be viewed as arising from differTABLE 3
RESULTSOF F-TEST FOR EQUALITYOF MEANSAMONGTRACTS,
ALL SALES, 1954-1964, ASSUMINGLOGNORMALDISTRIBUTION
DEGREESOF FREEDOM
Sale Date

Between
Tracts

Within
Tracts

10/13/54
7/12/55
8/11/59
2/24/60
3/13/62
3/16/62
10/ 9/62
4/28/64

58
64
12
70
120
132
5
18

237
255
26
213
324
456
12

45

F•
2.42
5.30
4.81
1.67
1.86
2.53
2.80
2.32

SOURCE:The entries in this table were calculated from data contained in U.S.,
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Bid Recap of OCS
Sales.
•All F values are significant at the .01 level except those for the 4/28/62 sale
which is significant at the .05 level and the 10/9/62 sale which is not significant at the .05 level.
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ing interpretations of commonly known information about the geophysics of the tract and the course of future events which will affect
the tract returns.
With the large dollar amounts involved, every potential competitor must be in
possession of certain geological and geophysical information regarding the tracts
of interest. Most of this information is obtained by the same standard geological
and geophysical procedures, and it will be a safe assumption, therefore, that most
of the competition is looking at the same basic data. The interpretation of such
data, however, and the evaluation of a tract's potential value may vary over a
wide range. 10

It is possible that the uncertainties in evaluation may be roughly proportional to the expected value of the tract. This would be an explanation of constancy of variance of logarithms of bids on tracts within
sales.
Hoel has discussed testing for the equality of variance among samples using likelihood ratio methods." In particular, he has defined a
variable with an approximate chi-square distribution and k - 1 degrees
12
of freedom, where k is the number of samples being compared.
This formulation is particularly applicable to the problem at hand,
since it is said to be accurate even though the sample sizes tend to
be small. The results of applying this test to the bids at each sale
are displayed in table 4. In no case was the value of chi-square large
enough to reject the hypothesis of equality of variances within a sale
at a significance level of 0.05 or lower.
Therefore, in computing the theoretical cumulative distribution
which was compared to the actual cumulative distribution of bids on
each tract, the mean of the theoretical distribution was estimated as
the natural logarithm of the geometric mean of the bids actually
received on the tract, but the variance used was the mean variance
for the respective entire sale.'" Thus it was feasible to avoid estimating
both parameters of the theoretical distribution for each tract from the
observations on that tract, and the sensitivity of the KolmogorovSmirnov test was preserved as much as possible. The "standard"
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tables for the critical value of the maximum
divergence between the theoretical and observed distributions were
calculated under the assumption that none of the parameters of the
theoretical distribution were estimated from the observed sample.
However, Lilliefors has calculated critical values for use in testing
whether or not a set of observations was likely to have come from a
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normal population when either the mean" or both the mean and the
variance 15 of the theoretical distribution were estimated from the
observed sample. During the period over which hids were analyzed, 16
251 tracts received four or more bids. 17 The maximum divergence
between the theoretical and observed distributions was tested at two
different confidence levels-20 percent and 5 percent. For forty-five
( 17.9 percent) of the tracts the maximum divergence exceeded the
appropriate 20 percent confidence level critical value; for nine of these
forty-five tracts ( 3.6 percent of the total population of 251) the maximum divergence exceeded the appropriate 5 percent confidence level
critical value. Both of the observed percentage rejections are below
the expected percentage rejections of 20 and 5 percent respectively.
Therefore, the hypothesis of lognormal distribution of bids on a tract
is not refuted and seems a reasonable one to adopt. 18
TABLE 4
RESULTSOF CHI-SQUARETESTS FOR EQUALITYOF VARIANCEAMO:-S:G
TRACTS,
ALL SALES, 1954-1964, ASSUMINGLoGNORMALDISTRIBUTION
Sale Date

Degrees of
Freedom•

ChiSquare

10/13/54
7/12/55
8/11/59
2/24/60
3/13/62
3/16/62
IOI 9/62
4/28/64

58
64
12
70
120
132
5
18

56.0
65.3
12.0
69.9
141
146
2.5
24.6

Mean Variance of Lognormal Distributionb
1.31
1.10
0.72
1.75
0.88
1.10
1.45
1.11

SouRCE: The entries in this table were calculated from the data contained in U.S.,
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Bid Recap of OCS
Sales.
"The number of degrees of freedom is the number of tracts in the sale which
received more than one bid, less one.
hThe properly weighted mean of all the individual tract variances in the sale. See
Hoel, equation ( 21), p. 199. All logarithms are natural logarithms.

3. THE PHEDICTION OF THE VARIANCE AND THE MEAN
In order to estimate P(Xo), the probability that a hid of amount
Xo will win the tract in question, it is necessary to predict the mean
and the variance of the assumed lognormal distribution of bids. In
the previous section it was noted that the variance of bids around
their respective tract means could be considered constant within a ~ale.
Unfortunately, this constancy of variance does not hold between sales.
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Using the same method as was used to calculate the results displayed
in table 4 gives a value of chi-square of 551 with 486 degrees of freedom. If the variance were constant between sales, a value of chi-square
as large as 551 would be expected with a probability of only 0.022;
thus the hypothesis does not seem likely. However, this apparent
nonconstancy of variance between sales does not necessarily mean
that a prediction of the variance at the present sale based on the
observed variances at past sales is useless. Such a prediction may well
be the best obtainable and quite valuable. The sensitivity of the
expected results from the bidding model to misestimations in the variance is of paramount importance here. This sensitivity will be investigated after the bidding model has been developed.
Examination of the individual sale variances shown in table 4 shows
no apparent time trend. If all the tracts in all the sales are lumped
together, the "pooled" variance about the individual tract means is
1.17. This method of calculation gives equal weight to each bid, no
matter when it occurred. If it seemed that the variance had a time
trend, one might use regression analysis to predict for the present sale,
or at least use a weighting for calculating the variance in which the
weight given to observations declines as one moves farther into the
past. Neither of these techniques appears useful here, however. In any
case, if future sales can be assumed to behave as past ones have, it will
be possible to predict a variance for the sale, though the prediction
may not be as accurate as might be desired.
Since the mean bids on tracts do not tend to be constant even
within sales, much less between sales, historical averages will probably not be of much use in estimating the mean of the assumed
lognormal distribution of bids which will be made on a particular
tract. However, since the hypothesis of uniform geometric mean bids
on tracts was rejected, one would predict the natural logarithms of
the bids of individual companies to be positively correlated with the
9
mean natural logarithm of all other bids on the tract.1 Such positive
correlation
these
presents
5
Table
found.
be
to
indeed
correlations are
the wildat
bidders
frequent
were
who
companies
coefficients for six
small
the
of
because
included
not
were
sales
cat sales. The drainage
of
absence
the
In
sales.
these
at
offered
were
which
bids
number of
desirable
and
possible
seem
therefore
would
it
,
information
any better
to base an estimate of the mean logarithm of the competitors' bids on
one's own bid. How this might be done is discussed in connection with
the bidding model developed in chapter 6.
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OF Bros ON A TRACT
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how an objective
estimate for P(Xo) may be formed. So far, evidence has been presented indicating that the bids on a tract tend to be distributed lognormally, and that it is possible for a company to estimate both the
variance and the mean of the lognormal distribution of bids for any
tract in which it is interested. However, there is one other variable
necessary for estimating P( Xo)-the number of competing bidders.
THE EXPECTED

NuMBER

TABLE 5
CORRELATIONCOEFFICIENTSBETWEEN LOGARITHMSOF COMPANY Brns AND
THE
MEAN LOGARITHMoF OTHER Brns ON EAcH TRACT,
WILDCAT SALES ONLY, SELECTEDCOMPANIES
SALE OF

SALE OF

SALE OF

10/13/54

SALE OF

SALE OF

7/12/55

2/24/60

3/13/62

3/16/62

Company
Name

No.
Bids

Corr.
Coef.

No.
Bids

Corr.
Coef.

No.
Bids

CATC
Shell
Gulf
Socal
Phillips
Humble

26
33
28
44
22
47

.61
.58
.40
.35
.68
.59

37
28
3
49
13
3

.67
.66
.73
.79
.72
.99

20
31

-.35
.59

35
21
4

.16
.21
.63

Corr.
Coef.

No.
Bids

Corr.
Coef.

No.
Bids

Corr.
Coef.

39
48
20
52
7
25

.31
.25
.45
.38
.78
.09

17
79
28
73
10
36

.63
.52
.68
.12
.46
.31

SouRcE: The entries in this table were calculated from data contained in U.S.,
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Bid Recap of
OCS

Sales.

Tracts which are potentially more valuable might be expected to
attract a larger number of bidders than those from which less is
expected. This hypothesis may be supported through least squares
regression analysis. If the number of bids on a tract is used as the
dependent variable and the logarithm of the geometric mean of the
bids received as the independent variable, then for each wildcat sale,
the regression coefficient for the independent variable is positive and
significantly different from zero at the .01 level. The multiple correlation coefficient varies from .6.3 for the sale of February 24, 1960,
down to ..3.3 for the sale of March 16, 1962. Thus, the tracts with
higher mean bids do seem to attract more bidders.
However, the individual firm does not know what the geometric
mean bid on the tract will be. It probably has only a very rough
estimate of this mean. Therefore, to attempt to estimate the number
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of bidders by first estimating the mean bid from one's own bid and
then using this projected mean to estimate the number of bidders
would seem likely to lead to poor predictions. Since the expected
values of the tracts to the bidding companies are unknown, there is
no way to see how poor this estimation procedure might be. The
closest one can come with the available data is to regress the logarithms of all bids received at a sale against the number of bidders on
the respective tracts. The multiple correlation coefficients thus obtained
are not high, the largest being .44 for the sale of February 24, 1960.
However, in the absence of reliable "grapevine" information about the
probable number of competitor bids, estimating the number of competing bids from one's own value estimate for the tract may be the
best method available, though the estimates obtained are not likely
to be very good. In the following chapter, the sensitivity of the
expected profit to misestimation of the number of competing bidders
will be carefully examined.

l

VI

A Bidding Model

1. INTRODUCTION
IN THE PREVIOUS
CHAPTERthe
,
following hypotheses about the lease
bonus bids for Louisiana outer continental shelf lands were developed:
( 1) the frequency distribution of the bids on a tract tends to be lognormal; ( 2) it is possible to estimate the variance of this distribution
from the records of previous sales; and ( 3) a rough estimate of the
number of competitors who will bid can be made. However, these
hypotheses are not sufficient to form the sole foundation for a bidding
model; additional assumptions about the behavior of the client firm
and its competitors are also necessary. In the next section a sufficient
set of assumptions is stated and discussed, and the model is developed. The following section explores the sensitivity of expected profit
to misestimates of the variance and the number of competing bidders.
The fourth section discusses briefly some bidding models based on
alternate firm goals; the final section indicates how the model may be
extended to include bidding on more than one object subject to possible constraints.
2. THE FORMULATION
OF THE MODEL
The following assumptions are sufficient to form the basis for a
bidding model:
1. There is only one tract for lease. This assumption is made for
convenience in developing the model. It will be relaxed in section 5.
2. The lease bonus will be the auction sale variable. Offers will be
made by sealed bids. When the bids are opened, the highest lease
bonus offered will win the lease.
3. Each firm's goal is to maximize expected profit. Two alternative
goals are discussed in section 4.
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4. There are no constraints on the amount which any firm may bid
if it so desires. Relaxing this assumption will also be discussed in
section 5.
5. Each of the firms is able to make an estimate of the present value
( the sum of the expected values of the differences of all future returns
and costs, except lease bonus cost, discounted to the present) of a
lease on the tract. The estimates of the firms are not necessarily
identical. However, each firm feels that its estimates of the present
value of the tract are unbiased in the statistical sense; that is, no firm
knows of any reason why its present value can be expected to be
either higher or lower than the geometric mean of the estimates of
its competitors.
6. Each firm knows that n other firms will submit bids for the tract;
1.
the total number of bids will thus be n
bids will be distributed
submitted
the
that
believe
7. All the firms
l population with a
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know
not
do
firms
bidding
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that
either
petitors, or, if they do, that no special information is available about
how the known competitors are likely to bid relative to the mean.
If R is the client firm's present value estimate for the tract, Xo the
amount bid, and P ( Xo) the probability that a bid of amount Xo will
win, then the expected profit from the bid may be written

+

= (R

E(Xo)

- Xo) P(Xo),

In order to find the value of Xo which maximizes expected profit, it is
necessary to write out the specific functional form of P ( Xo).
Assumption 7 implies that any dependence among competitors' bids
can be expressed as a joint dependence on the value of the mean of
the parent distribution. Given this mean, µ,, competitors' bids are
mutually independent, even though they are not independent unconditionally.' Suppose, temporarily, that there is only one competing
bidder, firm 1. If the true value of the mean of the distribution from
which X, can be regarded as a random drawing were known, the
density function for X, could be written as2
1

f(X,)

= ---~
x,

cr

v21r

exp -

( lnX, - µ,)2
?~----cr2

where <r is the population variance of the parent lognormal distribution. The probability that a bid of amount Xo would win is then
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= Prob
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,.

(6.1)

But µ is not known; only an estimate µ is available." One cannot simply replaceµ byµ in (6.1) in order to calculate P(Xo), since this
probability depends on the true, not the estimated value of the mean.
However, suppose that the client firm believes its estimate to be generated by an unbiased process such that
appears to be a random
drawing from a normal distribution with a variance of crt.The unbiasedness of the process implies that
is the best available estimate
of the mean of this normal distribution. In this case, the expected
value of the probability that the bid Xo will win is4
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(6.2)

It has been hypothesized that, given µ, competitors' bids will be
independent. Therefore, if more than one competing bidder is expected, the joint density function for all n competing bids may be
factored so that 5
f(Xi, X2 • • •, Xn I µ)

= f(X1

I µ) f(X2 I µ) • • • f(Xn I µ).

Further, since no special information is known about any of the X,,
that is, since all the f ( X, I 1.1.,)are considered identical, the joint
density function can be written

= [f(X1
= •,, = [f(Xn

f(X1 X2,, • •, Xn I µ)
[f(X2 I µ)]"

I µ)]"
I µ)]",

=
(6.3)

Therefore, it is usually not necessary to keep the subscripts denoting
the individuality of the competitors: in most places it will be sufficient
to use X0 as the symbol for the client firm's bid and an unsubscripted
X to denote a generalized opponent's bid. Using this notation, the
probability that a bid of Xo will win against n competing bids is
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P(Xo)
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( 6.4)

-----

Recalling the definition of expected profit as
E(Xo) = (R - Xo) P(Xo),

(6.5)

µ,

a- and a-,,, P ( Xo) as
it is apparent that for positive values of Xo,
( R - Xo)
defined by ( 6.4) is a strictly increasing function of Xo; but
ed profit
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Brns
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ln 52.18, a- = a-,, = 2.0, n

X0 , the
Amt. Bid

0.19
1.29
5.44
14.22
37.14
49.14
50.13
51.14
52.18
53.23
54.30
55.40
87.76
229.20
598.61
1563.38
10663.79

6

VAR YING

ACCORDING

CALCULATED

µ=
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R -

$

X0

99.81
98.71
95.,56
85.78
62.86
50.86
49.87
48.86
47.82
46.77
45.70
44.60
12.24
-129.20
-498.61
-1463.38
-10563.79

AssUJ\1IKG

AJ\10UJ',;TS,

= 5, AND
P(X 0

P ( X0

(6.4),

EQUATION

R

= $100
E(X

)

0.0004
.0054
.0269
.0644
.1332
.1604
.1625
.1646
.1666
.1688
.1709
.1731
.2272
.3652
.5224a
.673la
.8927a

$

0 )

0.04
0.54
2.54
5.52
8.37
8.16
8.10
8.04
7.97
7.89
7.81
7.72
2.78
-27.18
-260.45a
-987.94"
-9430.13"

integration errors.
"These values are not exact because of slight numerical

)
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bility of winning. In this case, the maximum expected profit occurs
for a bid of $37.14. The expected profit over a range is not very sensitive to relatively large percentage changes in the amount bid. For
example, increasing the amount bid per acre from $37.14 to $55.40,
an increase of 49 percent, only decreases the expected return by 8
percent from $8.37 to $7.72. This lack of sensitivity of expected profit
to variation in amount bid is due to the fact that, over this range of
Xo, the greater probability of winning with the hid of $55.40 almost
offsets the smaller difference between R and Xo.
The conventional technique for maximizing expected profit-finding
dE ( Xo) / dXo, setting the resultant derivative equal to zero, and solving for Xo-is awkward in this case because of the form of P(Xo).
However, if µ and CT'µ were known, the hid which would lead to maximum expected profit could be approximated as closely as desired
through a search technique similar to that which generated table 6.
How might the client firm estimate µ and CT'µ? If each firm believes
that its estimate of the expected value of the tract is unbiased and
that it is following the same strategy as each of its competitors, then
each company should regard its bid as the best estimate available for
the mean of the distribution from which the other bids can he regarded
as random drawings. This statement is implied by assumptions 5 and
7. To estimate the mean of the parent bid distribution as some other
value than one's own bid implies either that at least some firms are
not arriving at unbiased estimates of the present value of the tract
or that all firms are not following the same bidding strategy. In chapter 3, section 4, it was argued that it is not likely such a disequilibrium
situation could long continue; no firm with alert competitors can hope
to enjoy a favored position for long because of a special strategy. A
similar argument can he made with regard to evaluation techniques.
Therefore the usual game theory assumption-that opponents are as
skilled as the client-appears appropriate here and it seems reasonable
to estimate µ as the client's own optimal hid.6 This, of course, implies
that the expected value for each of the X, the optimal bids of the
client's competitors, also equals the client's optimal bid.
Continuing along this line of reasoning, U'µ may he estimated as
equal to the variance of the hid parent distribution a-. Why this can
be done may be explained by reference to a hypothetical statistical
problem. Suppose there exists a normally distributed population with
a known variance but unknown mean. It is necessary to estimate the
mean of the population from one random drawing from the population.
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The value drawn will be the best estimate available for the true mean.7
The variance of this estimated mean around the true mean will be the
population variance. The bid which the firm plans to place is analogous to the single drawing allowed in the hypothetical example; it
represents a random drawing from the distribution from which other
bids can be regarded as drawn.
But how can the client firm decide on the optimum bid when this
bid is a function of (i,? One way is through the following iterative
process:
1. Given values for R and er, and some rough estimate of µ,, use the
search technique to find that value of Xo which maximizes the expected
profit in ( 6.5).
2. Use the natural logarithm of the optimum Xo just calculated as a
new estimate of µ, and calculate a new value of Xo which now maximizes E ( Xo).
3. Repeat step 2 until the difference between two successive values
of Xo is smaller than some preassigned value. The resultant Xo is the
amount to be bid.
This procedure can be justified as a simulation of a learning process
in which firms have, over time, learned to relate their opponents'
bidding to their own value estimates and thus to their own bids.
Table 7 shows the expected profit resulting from bids of varying
amounts after convergence of the iterative procedure. The value of
fl for the initial step was $52.18 as shown in table 6. The values of er,
R, and n are identical for both tables. Four iterations were required
to move from table 6 to table 7.
O
Denote the optimum bid generated by the above process Xo •
If = lnX 0 ° and erµ = er are substituted into ( 6.4), then

µ,

P(Xo 0 )

=
( µ, - lnXo O ) 2
1
(oo [-exp - ¾ ------]
er•
) - 00 er y27T'
[ (Xo o

Jo

exp 1
X ery27T'

¾ ( lnX - µ, )• dX]n dµ,.

(6.6)

(T

It can be shown that
(6.7)

regardless of the value of

<T.

This result is hardly surprising. If firm
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TABLE 7
EXPECTED PROFIT FROM Brns OF VARYING AMOUNTS AFTER CONVERGENCE
OF !TEHATION PROCESS

ln Xo"

= µ=

ln 38.65,

X 0, the
Amt. Bid

0.14
0.96
4.03
10.53
27.51
36.40
37.14
37.89
38.65b
39.43
40.23
41.04
65.01
69.80
443.46
1158.18
7892.92

R -

$

CT=

X0

99.86
90.04
95.97
89.47
72.49
63.60
62.86
62.11
61.35
60.57
59.77
58.96
34.99
-69.80
-343.46
-1058.18
-7799.92

•These values not exact because
hThis is the value of X 0 ".

CT,,_

=

2, n

= 5 AND R =

P(X 0 )

0.0004
.0054
.0269
.0644
.1332
.1604
.1625
.1646
.1666
.1688
.1709
.1731
.2272
.3652
.5224"
.6751"
.8927·

of slight numerical

integration

$100.00

E(X 0 )

$

0.36
0.54
2.58
5.76
9.66
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.22
10.22
10.22
10.20
7.95
-25.49
-179.41"
-714.39"
-6962.87·

error.

0 has n equally shrewd bidding competitors, then the a priori probability that any one of the n + 1 bidders will win ought to be 1/ ( n + 1).
While the iterative procedure may be used to arrive at Xo", the
expected profit maximizing bid, it is both interesting and convenient
to develop a formula for calculating Xo" given R, CT, and n. Rewrite
equation ( 3.3) as
(6.8)
P( Xo") has just been said to be equal to 1/ ( n + 1) in equation ( 6.7)
above. The only remaining unknown other than Xo" in ( 6.8) is thus
P' ( X0"). Differentiating ( 6.4) with respect to Xo and evaluating the
result at Xo = Xo" and CT,,_ = CT gives'
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G(n),

Xoa:. <r
(6.9)

where G( n) denotes the value of the integral over p.,.It can be shown
that this integral is a function only of n and not of <Y. Table 8 displays
the values of G( n) for n from one through sixteen. Note that P.,may
not be regarded as identically equal to lnXo a:.in the process of obtaining P' ( Xoa:.) ; after convergence of the iterative process P ( Xoa:.) is
not a function of Xoa:.,but is equal to 1/(n + 1)-see equation (6.7).
P' ( Xoa:.) as defined by ( 6.9) may be described as the rate of change of
the expected probability of winning with respect to a change in amount
bid in the vicinity of Xoa:. with fl fixed at lnXo,:,.
TABLE 8
G( n)

EVALUATED

n

1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

FOR

n

FROM

ONE

THROUGH

SIXTEEN

G(n)
0.28208
.14104
.08578
.05815
.04224
.03219
.02542
.02062
.01710
.01442
.01234
.01069
.00936
.00827
.00736
.00660

Through the use of table 8, Xoa:.may be calculated directly without
going through the iterative procedure. Substituting P( Xoa:.) from ( 6.7)
and P' ( Xoa:.) from ( 6.9) into ( 6.5) one obtains
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= Xo"
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+ ------,-------,-~-=-c-~
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]
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1+~~-

(6.10)
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n(n

+

I) G(n)

Substituting n = 5 and er = 2 into ( 6.10) gives Xo" = $.38.76. This
compares with the value of Xo" shown in table 7 after the convergence
of the iterative process of $38.65. This slight difference arises from
the fact that the computer program which generated the table evaluated E ( Xo) at intervals of ( lnXo - v) I CT = 0.01. Had finer calculation
intervals been used, the value shown in table 7 would have been
closer to $38.76.
For given n and R, Xo* decreases as CT increases. In other words,
the smaller the variance of the distribution from which the bids
appear drawn, the higher will be the expected profit maximizing hid.
This result is intuitively satisfying, for CT is a measure of the expected
dispersion of the bids. But the dispersion of the bids has been postulated as caused by the variations in estimating the present value of
the tract. If there is no collusion and the dispersion of tract estimates
is generally thought to be low, no one will have much incentive to
bid considerably below his value estimate, for if he does, it is very
unlikely that he will win. On the other hand, a high <r indicates the
probability of wide variations in value estimates and increases the
possibility that a bid considerably below one's own value estimate
might win, thus providing an incentive to bid low. The usual argument states that profits should be higher in risky industries in order
to attract capital from risk-averse investors. The implication of this
discussion is that uncertainty about the outcome of individual investments can create a situation in which higher profits may be expected,
given some sort of barrier to entry into the industry."
A barrier to entry is still necessary, however, for above-normal
profits to exist according to this model since Xo* increases as n
increases for fixed R and CT. This may be demonstrated from equation
( 6.10) with the aid of table 8. As n increases, n ( n + I) increases
faster than G ( n) decreases; therefore, as n gets larger R is divided
by smaller numbers, so that Xo* increases. In fact,
Lim (Xo*)
n + oo

= R.
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In other words, if there exists a "large" number of competitors ( i.e., a

"pure" competition situation), a bid below one's value estimate has a
vanishingly small probability of winning, and there is no incentive
to so bid.
In summary, the above model has been developed specifically for
a bidding situation in which all the competitors are presumed to be
equally shrewd and equally well informed on the average. They have
learned to anticipate each other's reactions and have converged to a
stable strategy pattern. The strategy is said to be stable because once
all competitors use it, there is no incentive for anyone to depart from
it, unless he finds himself 1vith better information about the expected
value of the tract than others; otherwise, the client firm's expected
profit will be maximized if it bids the Xa" given by ( 6.10). Further,
the model predicts that among a total of n + 1 "equal" bidders, the
probability that a specific bidder will win is 1/ ( n + 1). Finallv, it predicts that the greater the uncertainty about the value of the object, the
smaller percentage of its expected value will be the optimal bid for
it. On the other hand, the larger the number of competing bids expected the higher the percentage of the expected value of the object
should be bid.
3.

THE

SENSITIVITY

OF EXPECTED

OF THE VARIANCE

PROFIT

AND THE NUMBER

TO MisESTIMATES
OF BIDDERS

The just-developed model takes into account the fact that µ, the
mean of the lognormal distribution from which the bids of competitors can be regarded as drawn, is only an estimate with an associated probability distribution. Should not similar modifications be
introduced because n and a- are estimates also? Unfortunately, no
satisfactory frequency distribution function has been found for either
n or u; thus a simple analytical treatment like that for fl is impossible.
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the sensitivity of expected
profit to misestimates in the values of n and a- in order to see how
important it might be to take into account the frequency distribution
functions of these parameters. Table 9 shows the average percentage
loss in expected profit from rnisestimating the number of competing
bidders for two different values of a-. The entries in this table were
calculated as follows:
l. Assume some arbitrary value for R.
be the estimated number of other bidders, n denote the
2. Let
actual number of competing bidders, :Ra"be the profit maximizing

n
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value of Xo calculated from ( 6.10) using n, and Xo" be the profit
maximizing value of Xo calculated using n.
3. E ( Xo" ) , the expected profit from a bid of Xo if n other bids are
placed, is calculated equal to

1

(R -

Xo" ) ( n

+l

).

A

4. E ( X," ), the expected profit if Xo" is bid because 11bids were
expected when actually n bids occurred, is calculated from equations
( 6.4) and ( 6..5) using ,;J,= lnXo".
5. Finally, the expected percentage loss in expected profit from
the misestirnation of the number of bidders is calculated as
Percent loss

[E ( Xo" ) -

= ---E(Xo"

E ( Xo" ) ]

)---

X 100%.

Examination of table 9 reveals that the expected percentage loss in
profit from rnisestimating the number of competing bidders is surTABLE 9
EXPECTEDPERCE",TAGEPnoFIT Loss FR0J\I MrsESTl~L\TIXG
NUMBER OF BIDDERSFOR A TRACT
Estimated
Number of
Other
Bidders, ~

Expected Percent Profit Loss
Actual Number of Other Bidders, n

1

3
Standard

5

7

9

Bids

1 ________________________
0.0
____
14.2
3
___10.1
0.0
5 _
_ --------- 17.1
1.6
7
---- ------__21.4
3.7
9
_24.4
5.5
11
--- _ ---26.6
7.1
13 -- -----------------_28.4
8.4
-----

26.1
1.8
0.0
0.5
1.4
2.4
3.2

=\/0.50
34:i:)
4.4
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.7
1.3
---

39.5
6.9
1.6
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.4

43.6
9.1
2.7
0.8
0.1
0.0
0.1

-- 0.0

6.5
---11.5
____________
14.8__
__17.1
______18.9
11 ---______
20.4
13 --------------

-

-------------

----

8.8
0.0
1.1

2.6
4.0
5.1
6.1

17-:0--22.8~-27.l
1.2
3.1
0.0
0.4
0.4
0.0
1.0
0.2
1.7
0.5
2.4
0.9

of

47.0
11.0
3.8
1.4
0.4
0.1
0.0

----~

Standard Deviation of Lognormal Distribution
Bids=
y2.0

1
3
5
7
9 -·

13

11

-----·

Deviation of Lognormal Distribution

4.8
1.1

0.2
0.0
0.1
0.3

30.4
6.4
2.0
0.6
0.1
0.0
0.1

of

33.2
7.8
2.7
1.0
0.3
0.1
0.0
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prisingly small in many cases. Therefore, in the absence of a known
frequency distribution function for n, it seems permissible to neglect
the fact that n is an estimate and not an observed parameter. However, if a satisfactory discrete frequency distribution function for n
could be obtained, then the expected profit from a bid of Xo could be
calculated as
k

A

E(Xo)

=I

[P(n)]

[R - Xo] [P(Xo, n)]

n=l

where P( n) is the estimated probability that exactly n competitors will
bid, k the largest number of competitor bids possible, and P ( Xo, n)
the probability that a bid of amount Xo by the client firm will win
over n competing bids. In this case, the computations become more
cumbersome, but some gain in efficiency is possible.
TABLE 10
EXPECTED PERCENTAGELoss FROM MrSESTIMATINGSTANDARDDEVIATION OF
Bms FOR A TRACT

Estimated
Standard
Deviation

Expected Percent Loss
Actual Standard Deviation,

fr

0.707

0.866

1.000
-------

Number

1.118

0.0
0.707
1.3
0.866
3.9
1.000
6.9
1.118
9.8
1.247
1.323 ----- ------------ 12.7
_ 15.4
1.414

1.1

0.0
0.6
1.8
3.3
5.0
6.6

of Competing

4.6
1.4
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.6
1.2

Number of Competing

0.707
0.866
1.000
1.118
1.247
1.323
1.414

----

-------- 0.0
1.8
5.2
----- 9.1
13.1
-16.9
-- -- 20.5

1.5
0.0
0.8
2.6
4.8
7.1
9.6

4.0
0.7
0.0
0.5
1.5
2.9
4.5

1.414

1.323

--

-----------

2.9
0.5
0.0
0.3
1.0
1.9
2.9

1.247

a-

6.5
2.1
0.4
0.0
0.3
1.0
1.9

Bidders

6.1
2.5
0.9
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.4

-- 1
-

7.4
3.5
1.5
0.6
0.1
0.0
0.1

Bidders

= 12

8.8
3.7
1..3
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.7

10.9
5.3
2.4
0.9
0.2
0.0
0.2

--------

8.6
4.4
2.2
1.0
0.4
0.1
0.0
12.8
6.8
3.5
1.7
0.6
0.1
0.0

Table 10 shows the average percentage loss in expected profit from
misestimating the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution
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of the opponents' bids for two values of n. The entries in this table
are calculated as follows:
1. Assume some arbitrary value for R.
2. Let ff be the estimated standard deviation, IT denote the actual
standard deviation, Xo" be the profit maximizing value of Xo calculated from ( 6.10) using ff, and Xo" be the profit maximizing value of
Xo calculated using IT.
3. E(Xo" ), the expected profit from a bid of Xo" if the actual
standard deviation turns out to be IT, is calculated equal to
(R-X

0") P(Xo")

= (R-Xo")

1
(n+f).

4. E ( Xo" ) , the expected profit if Xo" is bid because &-was the
expected standard deviation when actually the standard deviation
was equal to IT, is calculated from equations ( 6.4) and ( 6.5) using
/l "~ lnXo",
5. Finally, the expected percentage loss in expected profit from
misestimation of the standard deviation is calculated as
Percent loss

=

E ( Xo" ) - E ( Xo" )
E ( Xo,, )
X 100%.

The largest mean sale variance observed was 1.75 for the sale of
February 24, 1960;10 the corresponding standard deviation is 1.32. The
smallest mean sale variance and standard deviation observed were
0.72 and 0.85, respectively, for the sale of August 11, 1959.11 Within
this range of observed standard deviations, misestimates of IT would
appear to lead to very small percentage reductions of expected profits.
For example, if the standard deviation were estimated to be 1.323 but
actually turned out to be 0.866, the expected loss in profit due to
misestimation of IT amounted to 5.0 percent if there was only one
competing bidder and to 7.1 percent if there were 12 competitors bidding for the tract. The mean standard deviation over all sales is 1.08;
if this value had been used as the predicted IT at all sales to date, the
expected percentage profit loss from misestimating the standard deviation would, at most, have been less than two percent ( see table 10).
Therefore, in this case, it seems feasible to neglect the fact that IT
is an estimate and to treat it as a known parameter.
4.

MODEL

STABILITY

AND THE GOAL

OF THE FIRM

The model developed in section 2 is based on the assumption that
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each firm wishes to maximize the profit expected from bidding on the
object for sale. This model is stable in the sense that an iterative process in which one uses the just-prior estimate of the optimum bid as
an estimate of the mean of the distribution from which other bids are
regarded as drawn in order to make a new estimate of the optimum
bid always converges. 12 Other possible assumptions about company
goals do not always lead to stable models. For example, suppose that
the goal of the firm is to maximize the ratio of expected profit to the
expected amount spent. If P ( Xo) is the probability that a bid of
amount Xo will win, then XoP( Xo) is the expected amount spent, and
the ratio of the expected profit to this amount is

r=

E(Xo)
XoP(Xo)

~~~=

(R-

Xo)P(Xo)
XoP(Xo)

R -

=-~-~Xo

Xo

R

= Xo -l,

provided P( Xo) #- 0. However,

R
Lim r = Lim ( X
Xo-+-0 Xo-+-0 °

-

1)

=

oo.

Therefore, without additional assumptions, it is not possible to maximize this ratio, much less develop a stable model.
Yet this formulation is interesting for two reasons. First, it may give
some insight into why minimum acceptable bids are often stipulated
by sellers when auctions are announced. The reason usually given for
setting minimum bids is that of protecting the seller against possible
collusion among potential bidders.' 3 However, in a world where capital
rationing is often apparently important, the seller may need to set a
refusal price as a protection against those who would enter low bids
without expecting to win many objects, but hoping for large net
returns ( relative to\he amounts paid to the seller) on those few objects
purchased.
Second, in any practical situation, some cost C will be associated
with entering a bid. If this cost is included, then the ratio to be maximized will be
r

=

(R - Xo)P(Xo) - C
XoP(Xo)

R

Xo

C

-1-~~~~

XoP(Xo)'

( 6.11)

Whether or not a bidding model based on the above equation will be
stable depends on the form of P ( Xo). It is possible to differentiate r as
defined in ( 6.11) with respect to Xo, set it equal to zero, and thus find
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the first order conditions for maximizing r. However, the algebra is
tedious and the result expressed in the form of equation ( 6.10) is so
complicated that interpreting it is difficult and not particularly
enlightening.
It is important to note that including the cost of bidding as in ( 6.11)
is really not sufficient for developing a complete model for offshore
bidding. The difficulty lies in the fact that there are other outlays than
lease bonus-drilling and producing costs if oil or gas is found-which
will be necessary if the lease is won. The firm would presumably be
interested in maximizing the ratio of expected profit to expected total
present value of expenses, rather than the ratio of expected profit just
to expected lease bonus.
Of course there exist a number of "plausible" assumptions about
firm goals. One possible firm goal is maximizing the ratio of expected
profit to amount spent if the bid wins. This goal is interesting because
if it replaces assumption 3 in the list at the beginning of section 2 a
model results which is stable for some values of er and n, but not for
others. Call the ratio of expected profit to amount bid r. Then,
r=~~

E(Xo)
Xo

=

( R - Xo) p ( Xo)
Xo

=

R
P(Xo)[ Xo - lJ.

The first order condition for maximizing this ratio may be found by
differentiating r with respect to Xo and setting the derivative equal
to zero.
dr
dXo

=

R[

XoP'(Xo) - P(Xo)
Xo2
] - P'(Xo)

=

0.

Thus, the first order condition is satisfied when
Xo2P'(Xo)

=

R[XoP'(Xo) -

P(Xo)J.

( 6.12)

Call the value of Xo which satisfies ( 6.12) Xo. Now, equations ( 6.6),
( 6.7), and ( 6.9) define P ( XoO ) and P' ( XoO ) in terms of the distribution of the bids expected; the goals of the bidders do not enter into
their development so long as the goals and strategies of all the bidders
are the same. Therefore, these equations can be used to derive P ( Xo)
as equal to 1/(n + 1) and P'(Xo) as equal to (n/Xocr)G(n). Substituting these values into ( 6.12) one obtains
v
n
Xo2 ~X

oCT

G(n)

=

n
R[Xo~G(n)
AoCT

-~-J
n

1

+1

'
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Xon
-G(n)
a-

=

n
R[ - G(n)
a-

1
- -~],

and

n+I

(T

Xo

If a- > n(n

=

R[l - n(n

+ l)G(n)

( 6.13)

].

+ l)G(n)

then (6.13) gives a negative value for Xo, an
obviously irrational prediction; 14 in this case the model is not stable
l)G(n)
and the iterative procedure will not converge. If a-< n(n
equation
and
converges,
procedure
iterative
the
stable,
the model is
( 6.13) accurately predicts the convergent value of Xo.
Neither of the above goals is presented as a very likely actual company objective; the two examples were given to illustrate the sensitivity of the stability of the model to assumptions about the goal of
the bidding firms.

+

5.

MULTIPLICITY

OF TRACTS AND BIDDING CONSTRAINTS

The assumption of only one tract up for lease is unrealistic in connection with the petroleum land bids under consideration in this study;
in all sales so far, at least nineteen tracts were offered. A multiplicity
of available tracts will not affect the optimum bid calculated according to the model unless there are constraints on the amount which may
be bid or spent or on the rate of return expected.
It seems quite probable that a firm might have a limit on the amount
which may be spent for leases at a particular sale. Most firms budget
an amount each year for exploration expenditures. The size of this
exploration budget is a function of many factors, including the cash
flow position of the company, its ability to borrow, its beliefs about
future demand for and price of its products, and its expectation of
return from the exploration money expended. At any rate, the capital
available for exploration seems not to be unlimited; such capital
rationing appears to be almost universal not only in the petroleum
industry but also in many other industries as well. 15 Buying leases is
obviously not the only use for exploration funds; competitive uses
are geophysical exploration, purchasing interests in already leased
but untested property, etc. Further, money allocated to any one area
is often limited because of the desire for areal diversification.
However, since it is usually not possible to predict with certainty
which tracts among those bid on will be won, it is also usually not
possible to predict exactly how much will actually be spent at a sale.
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In such circumstances, a constraint on the expected amount spent
might be used. If P,(X.o'') is the probability of winning the i'th tract,
then IX.o''P,(X.a"') is the expected amount which will be spent. This
sort of constraint can be handled by the Lagrange multiplier method
described in section 1 of chapter 3. It is conceivable that some sort
of safety factor might be desired. In such a case, if C represents the
maximum it is desirable to spend and a is some safety factor larger
than 1, the relevant constraint can be formulated as
a I X,o"'P,(X.o"') = C.
I

Of course, in no case should a be so large that
a I X,o"'P1(X,o"')> I X,o"',
i

i

since it is not possible to spend more than the sum of all amounts bid.
A constraint expressing a minimum acceptable rate of return for
each tract presents no major problem. The Lagrange multiplier technique is capable of handling several constraints simultaneously; standard linear programming techniques may also be used. Other constraints, such as the requirement for a specified minimum or maximum
expected number of tracts to be won, may also be handled. Of course,
when more than one constraint is used, it may turn out to be impossible to satisfy all simultaneously. If this situation occurs, one or more
constraints may be changed until it is possible to satisfy all at once,
or the problem may be restructured.
A firm may wish to neglect the effect of constraints on the bidding
of its competitors. Or, if a firm wishes to assume that the constraints of
others will affect their bids in a manner similar to the effect on one's
own bids, then a further iteration can be used to arrive at the optimum
bids. The procedure may be outlined as follows:
1. For each tract, R, n, and U' are estimated; then Xo"' is calculated
from (6.10) and P,is evaluated as lnXo"', Now P(Xo) can be evaluated
for any bid on any tract.
2. The Lagrange multiplier technique including relevant constraints can now be applied and the solution obtained for that set
of bids which maximizes the aggregate expected profit subject to the
constraints applied.
3. On the assumption that all other bidders are subject to similar
constraints, the logarithms of the resultant bids can be respectively
substituted for the previous estimates of the µ,.
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4. Steps 2 and 3 can be repeated in sequence until successive bid
values converge.
If a firm feels that the constraints affecting competitors are not
identical with its own, then special procedures will probably be
necessary depending upon the particular assumptions involved.

VII

Summary

and Conclusions

is focused on a specific type of sealed bidding. Such
bidding necessarily takes place in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Current discussions about decision-making under uncertainty often fall
into one of two categories. To the first category belong attempts to
relate the psychology of investment allocation to subjective assessments of characteristics of possible investments. This study contributes little to this area. Particularly acute are problems concerning the
length of the time period over which the investor's expected utility
is to be maximized, the interdependencies of the outcomes of possible
concurrent investments, and the indefinite character of an investment
unit and the view-span of investors and managers. All these things
make it presently impossible to view a few specific acts by a group of
companies-say, bids for petroleum leases on tracts in certain areasand to attempt to infer comparative measures of each firm's attitude
toward uncertainty.
To the second category of discussions about decision-making under
uncertainty belong attempts to derive optimum procedures for attaining goals in particular situations. The main thrust of this study lies in
this area. Hypotheses about bidding behavior were tested against the
records of the Louisiana offshore sales. The hypotheses not rejected
were combined with other plausible assumptions in order to construct
a model for maximizing expected profit. This model is interesting in
at least three ways. First, it may provide a convenient conceptual
framework for a firm's thinking about submitting a bid at a current
sale, though in many situations a firm will probably not wish to consider its competitors a homogeneous group, for information about the
probable action of individual competitors may be available. Even if
the formulation of the model is not regarded as practical in an actual
situation, it may still serve to focus attention on some variables which
THIS MONOGRAPH
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almost certainly will be important no matter what conceptual framework is adopted for thinking about the problem. These variables include the estimated present value of the tract, the likely number of
competing bidders, and the probability distributions of competitor bids.
The second way in which the developed model is interesting lies
in its implications about behavior in imperfect markets under conditions of uncertainty. If the number of potential competitors is limited,
and selling and buying opportunities periodically occur, then the
model shows how a stable industry situation might result with each
firm earning economic profits on the average. The greater the uncertainty, ceteris paribus, the greater the expected economic profit from
each transaction, for the presence of uncertainty about the behavior
of competitors in effect provides incentive to bid below the expected
value when purchasing or to offer above cost when selling.
Finally, the relative insensitivity of the expected profit to the amount
bid over a considerable range of possible bids is somewhat surprising
until one examines the cause-that the difference between the expected
value of the object and the amount bid and the probability of winning
move in opposite directions with proposed changes in the amount
to be bid. The insensitivity means that it is not so important to place
precisely the right bid as might otherwise be the case.
It was not possible to test how well this model described the actual
bidding behavior of oil companies for the Louisiana offshore lands
because no data about company estimates of the expected values of
tracts were available. Thus, this model stands in need of empirical
verification. If such verification were forthcoming, this would tend to
substantiate the assumptions made in the development of the model
which could not be tested directly against the bid data. If the present
model does not describe actual behavior adequately, then it might
well be possible to modify it to increase its descriptive power.
Several areas for possible further research suggest themselves. An
obvious question is whether or not the bids in other situations tend to
be distributed lognormally with a predictable variance. Investigating
optimal bidding strategy when one firm has better information about
the present value of the offered object than the others might yield
interesting results.' Mead's research about conditions under which
sealed bidding ·is more advantageous to the seller than open bidding,
and vice versa; may have opened a fertile area for further work.
Certainly there is much to be learned about the psychology of competitor reactions. In a larger framework, there are many areas where
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the traditional deterministic models of mathematical microeconomics
need to be modified to introduce properly the uncertainties under
which actual firms must act.3
As Friedman has pointed out, the more uncertainty there is in a
business problem, the more likely a formal analysis is to generate a
solution which leads to significantly more profitable results than those
obtained by informal methods.4 While it has not been demonstrated
that the bidding model developed in this monograph is the best one
that a firm engaged in bidding for Louisiana offshore leases might use,
the development of the model is illustrative of the type of formal
analysis of a specific uncertain situation which may lead to better
decision-making under uncertainty by the firms which use it.
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